"The power of accurate observation is commonly called cynicism by those who have not got it." George Bernard Shaw

Showing posts with label Turkey. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Turkey. Show all posts

January 25, 2011

TURKEY’S EU MEMBERSHIP IN RATIONALIST AND LIBERAL APPROACHES

2011

Introduction

The negotiations between Turkey and European Union (EU) on the Turkish membership goes back to the 1959 when Turkey first applied for the associate membership. Since then, in more than 50 years, 21 new members joined the Union but Turkey only managed to be a official candidate in 1999 and start the negotiations in 2005. As the EU evolved through time with the joining of new members from different regions and traditions of the continent, it had to adopt new policies, institutions and arrangements to better absorb the new structure of the community. Alongside, there had been many theories that observed and analyzed the structures of the Union such as neo-realist, liberal intergovernmentalist and constructivist understandings.

My thesis is that Turkey deserves to be a member of the European Union which can be justified in rationalist (neo-realist and liberal intergovernmentalist) and constructivist approaches. Throughout the paper, first you will find a brief historical analyses of European Enlargement processes to better understand the progress it had experienced. In the second part, there will be a summary of Turkey – EU relations alongside with a brief summary of recent Turkish Foreign Policy direction. Next, there will be an analysis of theories, which are neo-realist, liberal intergovernmentalist and constructivist approaches, about European Union’s enlargement and integration processes with a perspective on Turkey’s membership on related topics. Finally, after having established the base for the thesis, you will read how I defend my thesis that Turkey deserves to be a member of the European Union in rationalist and constructivist perspectives.

I. History of European Union Enlargement

Before understanding the conceptions of integration and enlargement theories in EU and its relations with Turkey’s membership status, a brief summary of previous enlargement rounds that Europeans experienced should be drawn. It is certain that EU is not the same union as it was in 1950s, due to its ongoing change which includes both deepening in institutional means and widening in the means of new members. There were only 6 members when the union was first founded and there are now 27 EU members which means a geographically stretched and fundamentally evolved community. The enlargement rounds from 1973 to 2007 can be summed up in four headings: The United Kingdom (UK), Denmark and Ireland enlargement in 1973, Mediterranean enlargement in 1980s, EFTA enlargement in 1995 and finally the Central and Eastern European enlargement in 2004 and 2007.

To start with, there were, reasonable or not, economical and political reasons for UK not to join the group of founding countries that are France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and Netherlands and sign Treaty of Paris in 1952. Until 1961, British thoughts were to ignore the European countries due to economical reasons as the European Economic Community (EEC) can be a burden for British and political reasons as UK was still an imperial power (Nugent 2004, 22). However, political developments that are the rise of United States and Soviet Union as the new world powers and its reflections in Suez Crises and developments in economical relations among the EC members led the British officials rethink to join the community. After two de Gaulle rejections in 1961 and 1967, UK became a member in 1971. What motivated the existing members to accept UK were its possible contribution to the EC budget and the new market opportunities. Denmark and Ireland were other new members in the 1971 enlargement which was only the beginning of the ongoing enlargement rounds.

Second enlargement rounds is also called the Mediterranean enlargement as the new members were Greece in 1981 and Portugal and Spain in 1986. All three countries experienced dictatorships in 1970s and were trying to improve their standards following the democratization progress. What was significant about the acceptance of Greece were her very low rates of economical and political progress compared to the other members’ at that time (Nugent 2004, 27). The underlying motivation of member countries’ acceptance was to help Greece improve politically and economically with the support of the community norms to be reached. There are many thoughts that put nowadays’ Turkey parallel to Greece at that 1980s and claim that same tolerance can be shown to Turkey in order to help them improve their political and economical standards. However, today’s EU has more members than before which means a more difficult transaction on behalf of deepening in institutional and bureaucratic norms. In addition, it is very much argued shared history of Greece and European culture and the motivation to foster development in Greece drove their membership progress in a positive manner (Greece MFA 2011).

Third enlargement also has another name which is the EFTA enlargement as former EFTA members that are Austria, Finland and Sweden had joined the community in 1995. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and following the end of the Cold War, those three countries did not have a tendency to be neutral as before. The significance of this round was its quick and smooth progress due to the candidates’ already adjusted standards to the Union. The result was very positive as neither of the three countries were that huge to cause a major policy change and they all brought a Scandinavian culture of political transparency and democracy to the existing grounds of the Union (Nugent 2004, 30). Also to note that other EFTA members, which are Norway, Iceland and Switzerland, did not became a member because of the negative results in their referendum concerning the membership.

The last enlargement round that happened in 2004 and 2007, when 12 countries from Central and Eastern Europe (CEEC) joined the Union, was also an extension of the collapse of the Soviet union similar to the previous round. The major motivation of CEEC was to reintegrate to the Western Europe through the EU membership. On behalf of the Union, the major reasons were to establish a soft security sphere around the continent and incorporate the new markets to the existing economical relations (Nugent 2004, 35). Although these 12 countries had low GDP rates and the entrance bar to the Union became higher due to the increased numbers of acquis they nevertheless achieved to be accepted as members. However, this round made many thinkers question the future of the Union as it became more difficult to get deeper in the policy changes and institutional formations (Aggestam 2008, 360). Nevertheless, it was a giant step for both sides and the future formations will tell us if the decision was right.

In a rationalist approach, many think that the calculations of the cons and pros led existing members to accept the candidate countries as new members. New market opportunities, security issues or the desire to be a stronger political power in the world seem to suppress the doubts about the enlargements due to the low GDPs of the recent members (in the second and fourth rounds) or the possibility of fragmentation in policy areas and institutional organizations. The initiatives like Copenhagen Criteria, standards for candidate countries to reach, seem like a justifiable and acceptable approach to establish a more systematic understanding in enlargement but the reality is the evolution of the community’s former primitive role to the recent sophisticated situation.

II. Turkey – EU Relations and Turkey’s Recent Foreign Policy

Turkey’s EU membership journey starts in 1959 when the first application was done to be an associate member. Since the Turkish Republic was founded in 1923, the founders had a western-oriented approach but the related progress of Turkey in 20th century should be observed with its relevance to the Cold War period and subsequent Turkish foreign policy direction. Turkey’s memberships of Council of Europe in 1949 and of NATO in 1952 can be shown as evidences alongside her alliance with the United States and Western Europe during the Cold War. As Turkey was very close to the aggressive attitudes of the Soviet Union and complexity of the developing countries of the Middle East, she found herself close to the Western world of development as a path to increase her stability and improve her standards. Although, her geographical closeness to Asia along with the Ottoman past and religious background Turkey usually came face to face with obstacles other than economical and political standards.

The application in 1959 resulted as the Ankara agreement in 1964 which recognized Turkey’s desire to be a part of the European Community which can be achieved in the future, not at that time. What Turkey aimed also was her desire to weaken her dependency on the US but due to the low levels of development in competitive economy and high import substitution at that time, Turkey could not get a positive return from the EC. The 1970s was a period called “the self-exclusion” (Öniş 2000, 12) of Turkey from the membership when the domestic issues kept the country busy and she found her NATO membership enough against a possible Soviet threat. Also Turkish officials are said to have adopted a defensive attitude for their premature market conditions against the European competitiveness. Furthermore, the membership application of Greece in 1975 was underestimated and the possibility of their negative role against a Turkish candidacy as a member in the future was not foreseen (Öniş 2000, 11).

The military coup in 1980 led to a frozen relationship between the two sides and it continued until the application for full membership in 1987. What Turkey accomplished was a liberal economy, privatizations and increasing democracy level compared to past made the atmosphere more optimistic than before (Arıkan 2006, 86). But the Europeans did not share the same optimism and although they wished for Turkey’s good run for the future talks, they returned with negative comments due to the poor relations with Greece and the existing conflict in Cyprus. What actually disturbed the EC was the possibility of disharmony that Turkey’s membership would create as the community was becoming a political power after the Single European Act was signed in 1987. Other negative factors such as the large population, low development, high unemployment rates and poor indicators in human rights, rule of law and minority rights in Turkey made inappropriate ground for membership (ESI 2006).

The change in relations began in 1995 with the membership of Turkey in Customs Union and the acceptance of candidacy in Helsinki Summit in 1999 (EUSG 2007). The prominent reasons of this change during that time were the reforms made by the Turks (i.e. removal of death penalty), improving relations with Greece and the lobbying of US for Turkey to become a EU member. Although there was talks of possible partnership models instead of full membership status, Turkey officially started accession negotiations in 2005 to reach the standards of the Union that are drawn by the Copenhagen Criteria. However the negotiations did not go well until now as only 1 of the 35 chapters, that determine the capability of candidate’s membership, has been successfully closed by Turkey (EUSG 2007). On the other hand, Turkey seems to have adopted a new foreign policy which makes her to increase the alternatives of alliances in the East with Middle Eastern and Caucasian countries, alongside with the US, the continual ally.

It is remarkable that Turkey’s decreasing interest in EU membership and her increasing regional role in the Middle East seems to occur at the same time. The increasing political and economical influence of Turkey in the Middle East does not necessarily mean a shift from West to the East but her low level of performance in closing the chapters for EU membership makes people question if Turkey is aiming to be a leader in the East instead of being a part of the European Union and West. Since Ahmet Davutoglu became the new Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2009, Turkey adopted a “zero problem with neighbors” policy that aims to establish stability and peace in the region to foster the economic relations (Uslu 2009). As a result of the increasing economical relations with Middle Eastern countries, Turkey started to seem like an East-oriented country although the ties with the West are never split completely. Thus, increasing economical relations with neighbors and increasing the alternatives brought a chance for Turkish officials to become more active in political relations. This approach of Turkish Foreign Policy, which is increasing alternatives and maximizing benefits, is very close to be understood with a rationalist and neo-realist perspective.

III. Theories on European Enlargement and Integration and Turkey’s Membership

Before analyzing theories on the enlargement and integration issues, the question “What is Europe?” should be asked in order to be able to understand the concept of Europe and European Union. Should Europe be defined according to its geographical space which does not have a clear-cut border like Americas have? After the collapse of the Soviet Union, several former Soviet and/or Eastern/Central countries are accepted as European Union members. So does it mean that they each became a European country after the collapse of the Soviet Union? No, the answer is that even Russia, whose former geographical location is very much called the East, can be a “European” in the future. Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia are all in the east side of Turkey and considered as European according to the European Union’s Eastern Partnership Program (EEAS 2011). So, a geographical definition is a very difficult one to explain the borders of Europe and the boundaries of the EU does not exactly answer our question.

As Delanty writes, Europe is a cultural contestation and manifestation of a European modernity and civilization which means that every country, organization or unit that contributes to that culture is also a part of it (Delanty and Rumford 2005, 52). There is a diversity of civilizations in the European geography which is, at the same time, an area of civilizations that foster each other in time. Thus, Delanty summarizes as there is more than one Europe (Delanty and Rumford 2005, 37). What is interesting about the image of European Union is that people are inclined to think EU as the pure reflection of Europe which, in my opinion, is a mistake. This phenomenon’s fallacy has already been proven after the end of the Cold War and the joining of Central and Eastern European countries to the Union that is to represent Europe. Thus, Europe is not necessarily defined with its borders but it would be proper to think about the perspectives and related patterns that are brought by thinkers. There are many theories for European enlargement and integration which focus on political or economical factors with different perspectives such as neo-realist, liberal intergovernmentalist and constructivist.

• Neo-realist Approaches and Related Explanations for Turkey - EU Relations

To better understand the neo-realist approach and analyze the foundation of EU and its relations with Turkey accordingly, we should have a look at the writing of Kenneth Waltz. As Waltz explains that the international system is a composition of structures and interacting units (states) where every unit looks to care of his own (Waltz 1979, 79). The main aim of the units is to survive in the anarchical structure where you have to maximize your capabilities and overcome the power struggles. According to this theory, every country looks to behave in a rational way which is to survive and secure herself in the anarchical environment of world. Thus, the idea of cooperation is very possible for states to come together and form an alliance in order to decrease their vulnerability against other, to increase their capability and to achieve a balance of power. As a result, from a neo-realist perspective, states come together to cooperate to maintain their survival in the anarchical international arena (Pollack 2000, 3).

When we look at the founding principles of the European Union, it is obvious that the main aim was to create a sphere of cooperation to increase capabilities and decrease vulnerabilities. The result of the World War II was devastating for the continent and every country, including France and Germany, needed time and money to reconstruct both physically and mentally. As a result, the European Coal and Steel Community was founded by 6 European countries to increase the economical relations among them and accelerate the reconstruction. The political status and identity of today’s European Union was not an immediate aim for the founders which was fostered parallel to the economic developments of the community. A neo-realist approach would claim that what pushed these countries was, other than economical reasons, to stay together against the two leading countries of the anarchical system, the United States and the Soviet Union.

The significant thing is that the European Community maintained its presence after the end of the Cold War which was an important reason to bring them together. Yet, their integration and enlargement continued in instances like adopting the single currency in Maastricht Treaty in 1992 or adopting a qualified majority voting in Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 which both strengthened the union’s institutional role (Pollack 2000, 2). The end of the Cold War does not necessarily mean the end of the anarchical system that is described in the neo-realist approach. Nevertheless, the member states, which are to be the units seeking their own benefit, gradually developed an understanding of a European community that is not only to survive but to be collectively another polar in the multi-polarity of the post-cold war period.

To implement a rationalist approach of neo-realist theory into the Turkey’s EU membership, we should look at the cons and pros of the cooperation and decide on whether it is enough to explain the progress between the two sides in a neo-realist view. There are many advantages for EU to accept Turkey as a member and one of them is the Turkey’s capability to maintain the security. Turkish army is NATO’s second largest (The Economist 2006) and it is no doubt that her possible membership is a great asset for the European Security and Defense Policy. Furthermore, Turkey’s geographical position makes her an important spot as she is both linked with Caucasus, Middle East and the Mediterranean area. What makes Turkey an important regional actor is her shared history of bureaucracy and religion with the Middle Eastern countries. According to the neo-realist approach, states seek for their survival and security and adopt policies accordingly. Turkey is still in the same geographical area as she was in 1959 when she did her first application and she had approximately the same strong military approach at that time.

Thus, the rational approach of neo-realists in enlargement seems to be wrong on behalf of the Turkey’s membership issue. It seems proper when we think of the Eastern European countries’ acceptance as they provide a soft security with their membership. The former Soviet states accepted to be the safe-zone with their presence between the existing members and the East in exchange for their acceptance to the Union. On the other hand, Turkey has the similar, maybe more, offers for security and stability concerning the Caucasus and the Middle East in exchange for being an EU member. However, 50 years have passed since the first application of Turkey and it seems that it is not possible to accept the neo-realist approach alone to understand the enlargement of the European Union.

• Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approaches and Related Explanations for Turkey – EU Relations

Similar to neo-realist theorists’ rationalist approaches, liberal intergovernmentalists also share the rationalist understanding but other than a security level. They see the relationships of member countries in an economical perspective and assume that the economical interdependence among the countries makes war an unbeneficial choice (Pollack 2000, 4). Neo-realists claimed that the European countries unified due to the anarchical structures of the Cold War period and according to their approach their unity had to be ended after the end of it. However, European Union continues its journey in the post-cold war period. What liberals argue is that the shared values of democracy and existing commercial linkages between the member countries are the reasons that hold members together (Pollack 2000, 4).

As Pollack refers to Andrew Moravcsik that liberal intergovernmentalism has three steps: “a liberal theory of national preference formation, intergovernmental theory of bargaining and a new theory of institutional choice stressing the importance of credible commitments.” (Pollack 2000, 11). Against the security underlining of the realist approaches, liberals underline the economical relations of states which are related to domestic spheres are the basis for the relations. Thus states’ domestic preferences leads to a bargaining process among them which make international institutions as some kind of tools to arrange the relations of preferences between the states.

When we look at the liberal-intergovernmentalist approach on European Union concept, we see that states’ aim is to maximize their economical interest that is correlated with the domestic preferences. When we count on the states’ economical aim that much, it is inevitable to underestimate the role of the EU institutions and the role of the supranational structure of the Union. The commercial interdependence and the domestic preferences related to financial factors seem to be the major points of the liberal approach that define the unification of the European countries on these criterions. The rationalist approach to maximize the interests in economical means is fair enough to justify the memberships of Greece in 1981 or Eastern European countries in 2004 and 2007. On the other hand, trying to understand Turkey’s rejections in a liberal level is not very possible.

One of Turkey’s main strengths is her large population and developing industry which means a new market for European Union countries. It has the potential of a new consumer group of 75 million to be reached where the demand for the European products would never be low. Also Turkey’s links with the Caucasus and the Middle East makes her very valuable to reach other markets. It has good relations with her neighbors which can be again a valuable asset for the EU. On the other hand low levels of GDP rates can be a negative factor for EU’s decisions on the economical means (ESI 2006). However, as I mentioned above, countries with low GDPs like Greece, Bulgaria and Romania are also accepted as members. What liberal-intergovernmentalist approach cannot explain alone is the rejection of Turkey’s membership by EU despite the potential of Turkey’s large population of consumers and her geographical positions as advantages.

• Constructivist Approaches and Related Explanations for Turkey – EU Relations

In his study of constructivism David Houghton simplifies the definition of constructivism very neatly: “Put simply, human beings matter because it is they who fashion and have capacity to change social reality” (Houghton 2007, 28). So the society and structures we live in comes from a social reality that is constructed by its elements. However, human beings do not live isolated to this sphere of constructed reality. Both the human beings and the realities effect each other and construct a different reality than before. The tools for shaping the reality of the society is the sum of shared ideas, beliefs, identities and actions and these are also the part of the society that is constructed (Wendt 1999, 1). It is sure that the material relations in international politics are very much focused on but the important thing is how we identify the materials related to practical actions with norms, values, beliefs and ideas.

Compared to rationalist ideas, which generally frames the role of institutions at how they help agents or organizations to pursue their interests, constructivist approach underline that the institutions that are created by human beings are some sort of sources that shape the preferences and identities of the members. (Pollack 2000, 15). At that point, constructivists argue that rationalists such as neo-realists and liberal intergovernmentalists are not capable of observing institutions in the meaning of its effects on identities and behaviors. Though, as Pollack mentions about Moravcsik’s observations, constructivists, despite their emphasis on the facts of social science, are not very encouraged to empirically test their studies which is a fundamental weakness (Pollack 2000, 16).

From a constructivist approach, the European Union project seems like very well constructed one with the help of institutions such as European Court of Justice, European Parliament or European Council alongside. Furthermore, the shared values, norms and beliefs from a democratically nurtured history and philosophy establish an environment for the EU members to be able to stay together. However, the question of the continuing national governments as parts of the Union is an important one considering their ability to create diversity inside the unity. According to Delanty, national identities and European identity are not elements that confront but elements that complement each other (Delanty and Rumford 2005, 30). He underlines that a post-national self-understanding in European identity is what matters beyond the national identities that has ability to tackle the unity. Shared values in the concepts like religion, history and democracy are some of the examples that create a unification of European identities. Though, Delanty also points out that there are mentally and physically several Europes in the geopolitical space of Europe which can be considered in civilizational, political and continental factors (Delanty and Rumford 2005, 37).

The formation of the European identity and the integration of the multiple identities in geographical and geopolitical spheres is quite understandable in the above mentioned constructivist approach. The question is can we understand the rejection of Turkish membership in that framework? When we look at the history of Turkey and European countries, there can be seen a geographical distinction between them until the Ottomans’ reach to the Vienna in 1600s and it can be shown as an evidence to the reality of the history that is not common. However, according to Delanty, there are three major geopolitical components that create the Europeanization: Judeo-Christian, Russian-Slavic and Islamic-Turkish (Delanty and Rumford 2005, 37). It is for sure that contributing to the history of Europe in some degree is not a valid card that guarantee the membership of Turkey to EU. Nevertheless, the reality that Turkey’s geographical distance to the core of the continent is not the only reality. On the other hand, it is popularly argued that the low level of performances of Turkey in norms like human rights, minority rights and rule of law prevent a more optimistic approach on Turkish membership (ESI 2006). To conclude, we can say that a constructivist approach can both defend and criticize the acceptance of Turkey at the same time. It can be criticized as Turkey do not have the exact shared values in aspects like religion or democratic values and it can be defended that Europeanization is a continuing process of integrating multiple identities which can also be seen at the acceptance of former Soviet countries as members.

IV. Justifications of Turkish Membership in Rationalist and Constructivist Approaches

Throughout the paper, I analyzed the historical process of European enlargement and Turkey – EU relations and after that I framed three theoretical approaches, which are neo-realist, liberal intergovernmentalist and constructivist approaches, to better understand the underlying factors on the European foundations and related experience of Turkey’s non-acceptance to the Union. In this part, I will argue about the facts that justify Turkey’s EU membership in rationalist (neo-realist and liberal intergovernmentalist) and constructivist approaches. I firmly believe that the addition of Turkey into the European Union would be a great asset for the continent in a rationalist view. In addition I will discuss that how Turkey can be embedded in the European society in a constructivist view.

In a rationalist approach, we should write down the cons and pros of the possible membership of Turkey. But before that, we should analyze the structure of the state relations to properly put the Turkish membership in that framework. After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union the unipolar structure of the world stage is changed. At first it seemed like an emerging bipolar world which the US would lead but the process showed that it became a multipolar world where regional powers gained importance both politically and economically. Today there are several powers which are trying to be regionally, and globally as well, influent such as China, Russia, India, Brazil and Turkey in the last couple of years. But European Union, due to its long history of alliances and experiences of integration and enlargement, seems to be in a different position. Although EU experienced issues of deepening problems and economical obstacles in the last couple of years, it is still the most reputable organization concerning Europe.

Turkey, on the other hand, is a country that is trying to be more influent in her region of Middle East. Since Turkish Foreign Policy officials adopted a “zero problem with neighbors” policy, they started to have increasing relationships with her neighbors in economical and diplomatic channels. This time of period is parallel to the time of events when Turkey seemed to slow down the EU membership process and public opinion started to discuss about Turkey’s Eastern inclination which is surprising compared to her Western-oriented approach in the past (Friedman 2010). Nonetheless, this new approach of Turkey may be a chance to prove her resources’ worth to the West which are basically her economical and diplomatic relations with the Middle East and Caucasus also.

This is obviously a rationalist view to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of the Turkish membership for the possibilities of strengthening EU’s regional power status. The most prominent advantages of Turkey is her large army which is a definite contribution the EU’s defense. Also the policy that is pursued to enhance the security of the East while accepting memberships of Eastern countries can be repeated in a different way if Turkey can be seen as an important factor to secure the South Eastern part of the continent with its geographical position. In a rationalist approach again, from a liberal perspective this time, inclusion of Turkey means a new market of approximately 75 million new customers also with the emerging areas, that are not developed very well such as industry of several materials, to be invested. In addition, Turkey’s recent good economic relations with the Middle Eastern countries increases her importance for EU as a channel to reach the further new markets.

Again from a rationalist perspective, there are also disadvantages and possible anxieties of Europeans for Turkish membership. What seems like a threat to the European Union is Turkey’s high rates of unemployment (ESI 2006). Although the young population of Turkey may sound like a possible force to increase the productiveness of European industry (Timmerman and Mels 2008, 19) many Europeans fear of the inevitable immigration of Turkish people who are to take their place in lower wages and poorer conditions (ESI 2006). This fear of the public opinion, which is in mostly practical and contemporary understanding, cannot be ignored by the national and institutional organs of the Union. Furthermore, the low rates of literacy and GDP and other similar economical factors can be an economical burden for the EU budget which has a mission to compensate each member’s status in order to decrease large level of differences among the member countries (ESI 2006).

As Helena Sjursen underlines that European expanding consists of two basic assumptions that are pragmatic thinking which we can relate to the rationalist understanding and ethical/political thinking which we can relate to the constructivist understanding (Sjursen 2002, 508). Conception of collective understanding of Europeans and the EU as a reflection of it seems to be the source of obstacle that slows down the Turkish membership. Turkey is counted as not sharing the democratic values of European countries such as human rights, rule of law or respect to minorities. Although Turkey and her Ottoman past is very much related to the European history, Turkey is seen as an Asian due to her identity related to geographical and societal factors. This approach can be proven from another perspective of constructivist thinking as Delanty underlines that Europe is not essentially a geographical border that is being changed over time constantly (Delanty and Rumford 2005, 68). As an evidence, recent members from Eastern Europe have a Soviet past of an authoritative regime but they were accepted as members. Turkey, both from a rationalist and constructivist perspective, should be accepted by European Union as a member to contribute to the practical purposes and evolving identity of the European region.

Conclusion

Throughout the paper, I argued about the justifications of Turkey’s membership in rationalist and constructivist approaches. Before thinking about Turkey’s membership, I thought that the enlargement rounds, and acceptance of 21 new members as a result, had to be analyzed to understand the enlargement processes happened in the past. What is significant is that the membership negotiations between Turkey and the EU does not seem like any negotiation happened before concerning its time and content. What I argued is that Turkey deserves to be a European Union member due to its possible contributions in economical and political areas which fits in the rationalist approach of study. Furthermore, from a constructivist approach I tried to prove the fallacy in the belief that Turkey would not be able to share the values and history of European culture. On the contrary, I underlined that Turkey has a part in the history of Europe and also the constantly evolving culture of Europeanization has the power to absorb Turkey and her different but connected history and values.




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WHY THE UNITED STATES NEED TURKEY AS AN ALLY

2011

Introduction

Turkey and the United States (US) have been a long time ally and they had been in cooperation since 1940s. Although it does not seem like a long time relationship, both countries went through a lot of events and it seems like they will probably have to continue their relationship in the future. Since the end of the Cold War and its bipolar structure that was led by the US and the Soviet Union (USSR), the world structure is being changed by the reshaping of the structures that seems more like a multipolar one in which regional alliances and regional powers would not leave the US alone. Turkey is one of the units in this system that is emerging as a power that influences her neighborhood in diplomatic and economical channels.

In this paper, I will argue the reasons for why the US needs to stay in cooperation with Turkey and how important Turkey is for the US from a neo-realist perspective. To better explain my argument, I will first mention the historical relations between Turkey and the US from 1940s to 2000s which is to form a base for further explanations. Then you will find a part that undergoes the structural and state-level analysis that is related to the relations between Turkey and the US, again from a neo-realist approach. In this last part, I briefly explain why the US significantly needs Turkey to stay as an ally and bring two practical cases to prove the importance of this relationship.

I. Relations Between Turkey and the United States From 1940s to 2000s

Relations between Turkey and the United States seem to get actually started in 1940s after the end of the World War II. To start with, Turkey had adopted a neutral position during the war which was resulted in a smooth process on behalf of Turkey during the conflicts but in an abyss afterwards. As Turkey did not select a side and join the battle, his hand was not very strong in the negotiations of polarization between the East and the West. After the end of the war, Soviet Union showed an aggressive attitude towards Turkey on the territorial concessions regarding the 1925 Treaty of Friendship which made Turkey lean towards the United States to be protected (Turkey MFA 2011). Actually, the US and the USSR was having a micro level Cold War in the Turkey case which was resulted as a Turkey-US alliance with the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan in the first step. The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were to help Turkey and Greece in economical and military aspects against the possible Soviet aggressiveness.

Another important step was Turkey’s NATO membership in 1952 which happened in exchange for Turkey’s military contribution to the war in Korea. This was requested by the West as an opportunity for Turkey to show which side they were on. A similar incident, as an evidence of polarization and the tense relations of the US and the USSR, occurred in the Cuban Missile Crises when the Soviets placed nuclear missiles in Cuba and the Americans placed some in the Turkish land. It was a thrilling peak of the tense relations of Cold War when two world powers were threatening each other with their nuclear war heads (Global Security 2011). During the Cold War, Turkey adopted a mission as being a safety zone in the south eastern flank of NATO and as a neighbor against the East, the Warsaw Pact countries.

Until 1974, the two sides increased their relationship rapidly in economical, diplomatic and military aspects. However, Turkey’s Cyprus intervention in 1974 became a turning point in the alliance as the United States never wanted a Turkish intervention in the island and had warned them accordingly. Thus, the intervention resulted as an arms embargo by the United States starting from 1975 and ending in 1978. Although this incident caused considerably damage in the relations, as a reflection that their alliance focused on defense and security throughout the years, they signed a Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement in 1980 which still forms the contractual basis between the two countries (Turkey MFA 2011). During the 1990s, the economical assistance given by the US to Turkey was decreased and turned into loans. In 1997, the mutual cooperation between the two sides was formulated in five topics: energy, economy and trade, regional cooperation, Cyprus and the defense and security cooperation (Turkey MFA 2011). In 1999, they officially called each other as “strategic partners”, which meant a multi-dimensional cooperation in a wide range of topics and regions.

The relations between the two countries went tense again in 2003 when the Turkish Grand National Assembly voted against the Americans’ desire to use the Turkish lands in their military operations during the Iraq war. However they were allowed to use the İncirlik Base during their operations along with the airspace of Turkey. To improve the relations, in 2006, both sides signed an agreement called “Shared Vision and Structured Dialogue to Advance the Strategic Partnership” which was the first time the two sides attempted to build their relations in a guided way that will define and direct the scope of the cooperation (Turkey MFA 2011). The agreement and the arrangements between Turkey and the United States show that the relationship between the two sides would be multi-level and multi-faceted in several topics and regions.

II. A Structural and State Level Analysis in a Neo-Realist Perspective

To better understand the relations between the two sides and the reasons that I will present for how significantly US needs Turkey as an ally, we should first have a look at the structural and state level of analysis of today’s world. It is obvious that the world is very different compared to the 20th century’s Cold War period of bipolar structure. The change of structures also reflected in the formation and relations of states with each other. In my opinion a neo-realist approach would be proper to explain the ongoing process in a rationalist perspective. Although some other approaches, like neo-liberal or constructivist, can also be adopted to explain the contemporary integration of foreign policies of two countries, a neo-realist approach seems enough to take a picture of the stances.

One of the prominent neo-realist thinkers, Kenneth Waltz, defines the international system as a composition of structures and interacting units (states) where every unit looks to take care of his own (Waltz 1979, 79). Waltz underlines that international politics is the realm of power and struggle and continues that the relations of units and the changes in the structure are two factors that are affected by each other to finally form a new system (Waltz 1979, 79). There are two significant examples that can be shown as evidences to that explanation. First one is the end of the World War II which is resulted as the emerging new world powers that are the US and the USSR and decreasing influences of once an imperial power the United Kingdom and the European countries such as France and Germany. Another example as an evidence of changed structures and its effect on the units is the end of the Cold War when the bipolar structure of the world that is influenced by the US and the USSR ended and led to a US-led unipolarity perception at first and a multipolar reality afterwards. In today’s world, regional powers and regional alliances and their influences in the world stage creates a multipolar environment. However, not only the structures, also the actions of the units that are taking care of their own benefits are also should be analyzed.

Waltz emphasizes that “the structure of a system changes with changes in the distribution of capabilities across the system’s units” (Waltz 1979, 97) which brings us to the movements of states that are trying to maximize their benefits in a rational understanding. To better comprehend the US’ noteworthy need for Turkey’s companionship in the reshaped world structure, the new foreign policy direction of Turkey should be carefully examined. After Ahmet Davutoglu came into power as the new Minister of Foreign Affairs of the state in 2009, Turkey adopted a “zero problem with neighborhood” policy which aims for a more stabile and peaceful environment in the complex settings of her region, especially the Middle East (Uslu 2009). Thus, Turkey is aiming to build a new position for herself by acting in a proactive approach which is different than the reactive policy in the bipolar structure of the Cold War.

What Turkey accomplished can be summarized in two dimensions. First is to increase the diplomatic relations with her neighbors and even attempt to be a mediator between the countries that are in tense relations. Being a mediator between Iraq and Syria, between Israel and Syria and finally between Iran and the Western hemisphere in the nuclear proliferation issue show the intentions of Turkey’s emerging desire to be proactive in diplomatic/political sphere. This attempt, a multi-level and proactive approach, is a restructuring of Turkish Foreign Policy, which is result of the end of the Cold War and its bipolar structure of nature, and very different from the policies of the past which was generally one dimensional that was very much influenced by the Western approaches.

Another dimension is the increasing economical relations with the Middle Eastern countries and its effects. The increasing economical trade numbers with the Middle Eastern countries, emerged with her diplomatic relations, created a public opinion that Turkey is abandoning her Western-oriented stance and turning back to the East. Thomas Friedman, in his article called “Letter From Istanbul” in June 2010, questions Turkey’s new stance as she is trying to join the Arab League instead of the European Union (Friedman 2010). The reason Friedman and similar thinkers ask such a question is the increasing relations with the East that is very active compared to the past. The search for stability and peace is not only rhetoric in Turkish Foreign Policy, but it is for to create an environment in the region where the economical relations could increase due to the increased stability and prosperity. It is important to remember that increasing trade numbers with the East does not necessarily mean a decrease with Western relationship. Also the energy related relations with Armenia, Azerbaijan and especially Russia is an attempt to increase her alternatives in that topic. I firmly believe that what Turkey is trying to do is increasing her alternatives and maximizing her benefit which is quite understandable from the neo-realist perspective of Waltz. In addition, James Jeffrey, the former US ambassador in Turkey, shares this observation in his report to the government that is published by the Wikileaks: “Does all this mean that the country is becoming more focused on the Islamist world and its Muslim tradition in its foreign policy? Absolutely. Does it mean that it is "abandoning" or wants to abandon its traditional Western orientation and willingness to cooperate with us? Absolutely not” (Wikileaks 2010).

III. The Reasons for the Need of Turkey’s Alliance

In this part, I will try to analyze the reasons for why US needs Turkey to stay as an ally and how important Turkey’s alliance is for the US. As I have mentioned above, the world is different than the 20th century’s bipolar structure. Today’s world presents us the importance of emerging powers from different parts of the world that acts their foreign policies both alone and in regional alliances. Rise of the countries like China, India, Brazil and Russia alongside with Turkey and Iran and also the increasing enlargement and deepening of the European Union are reshaping the structures in a multipolar way instead of the unipolarity of US leadership. The rise of the alliances is a result of the power gap against the US due to the collapse of the USSR which urged several countries to establish multi-level cooperations with other countries.

The United States, who have long term plans for the Middle East region due to its energy resources, need Turkey as an ally in the region. I firmly believe that the reasons for the US to stick to her alliance with Turkey lie in Turkey’s Western and Eastern identities. Since her foundation, Turkey has a Western inclination with her institutions and shared values with the West. As a result, Turkey is the only country in the East that had adopted a Western approach other than Israel. On the other hand Turkey shares a common historical and religious background with the Eastern countries which makes her closer to the East at the same time. Thus, this double identity, which Turkish Foreign Policy officials seems to had realized and had been acting accordingly in their increasing proactivity, makes Turkey an invaluable asset for the US. First, the US can sit on the table with Turkey due to their shared values of West and second, Turkey can be a very good ally in relations with the Middle East due to her shared history and religion with the East. Actually, James Jeffrey summarizes Turkey’s situation very well: “Turkey will remain a complicated blend of world class "Western" institutions, competencies, and orientation, and Middle Eastern culture and religion” (Wikileaks 2010).

To draw the importance of Turkey on behalf of the US, apart from underlining the shared values of Western tradition and closeness to the East, I believe that an addition of practical incidents also should be observed. For this purpose, I selected two cases that US need the alliance and assistance from Turkey which are a) the implementation of NATO’s nuclear missile shield and radar system in Europe and Turkey and b) filling the power gap in the Iraq for the good of the US after they accomplish their withdrawal from the area. In both cases, due to the emerging multi-level structure of the world, the US does not have the power to accomplish alone.

It is not like the one in the Cold War but nuclear proliferation of Iran is still counted as a threat by the Western world and especially by the US. Nobody officially declare the possible threat from Russia but she also possesses the nuclear power that can be a threat in the future. In 2010, NATO, which seems to regenerate its influence by aiming international terror instead of the Soviet threat in the Cold War, agreed on a nuclear missile shield in Europe and a radar system in Turkey. The final details are not accomplished but the summary of the meeting was that a Western desire to unite against any serious nuclear threat from the East was occurred. Turkey accepted his part for the defense and underlined her possible importance for the Western world and the US against any threat from the East. The significance Turkey pointed out that she has the geographical importance which is being the link between the West and the East. As a result, Turkey’s geopolitical importance makes her such an ally that cannot be abandoned.

Second case is about the withdrawal of US troops and political influence from Northern Iraq and the probable power gap that can occur as a result. There are three prominent groups in Iraq which are Shias, Sunnis and Kurds. All these three groups need to compromise among themselves in order achieve in important issues like reconstruction of the country, sharing the resources, forming the government and also reshaping and stabilizing the bureaucracy. The United States’ military withdrawal does not mean they will be abandoning their purposes in the region and they will be in need of an influent ally which, the most probable, is Turkey. Many reports claim that Shias can be close with Iran and Sunnis can be close with the Arab world, whereas Kurds might be willing to cooperate with Turkey to further their stability and interconnection with the West (Rudaw 2010). David L. Phillips, Senior Fellow and Deputy Director of the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations, supports the relations between Turkey-Kurdish Regional Government (KRG): "The KRG has been prudent by developing close diplomatic and commercial ties with Turkey. Ankara is an important strategic partner and acts as a counter-weight to Baghdad. The KRG should continue to strengthen those ties while maintaining constructive relations with others" (Rudaw 2010).

As it can be seen from these two cases, from a rationalist/neo-realist perspective Turkey can play a significant role to help the US achieve her goals which are to continue her influence in the complexity of the Middle East region and to have a defense mechanism that is like an alliance against any possible threats of violence. Furthermore, Turkey’ increasing activism in the Middle East region with the combination of Western linkages make her an invaluable ally for not only above mentioned two cases, but also for the future incidents. It was not the purpose of this paper to draw a frame for possible advantages of the US’ alliance for Turkey but needless to say that US support means a lot for Turkey in relations with Cyprus, Caucasus, Russia, European Union and Israel. Again, from the neo-realist perspective, there are many things that US can offer to Turkey in exchange for her benefits.

Conclusion

Throughout the paper, I argued about the importance of Turkey as an ally for the US and the reasons for the US to stick to his alliance with Turkey. From a neo-realist perspective, the change in the structures after the end of the Cold War resulted in multipolarity in the world where several soft/middle powers and regional alliances emerged. Turkey, as a country that share the Western traditions and institutions alongside the common history and religious background with the Middle Eastern countries, is a very important ally for the US as she is increasing her alternatives and maximizing her benefit through her “zero problem” policy. Turkey’s increasing diplomatic and economical relations with her neighbors make her a prominent actor in the region where the US needs a powerful ally in several issues.



Bibliography

Friedman, Thomas. 2010. Letter From Istanbul. The New York Times. Accessed January 16. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/16/opinion/16friedman.html

Global Security. 2011. Cuban Missile Crisis. Accessed January 16. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/cuba-62.htm

Turkey MFA (Ministry of Affairs). 2011. Turkish-US Political Relations. Accessed January 16. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkish-u_s_-political-relations.en.mfa

Rudaw. 2010. US Withdrawal Will Leave Iraqi Kurds More Dependent on Neighbors. Accessed January 16. http://www.rudaw.net/english/kurds/3142.html

Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Wikileaks. 2010. What Lies Beneath Ankara’s New Foreign Policy. 10ANKARA87. Accessed January 16. http://www.wikileaks.ch/cable/2010/01/10ANKARA87.html

Uslu, Emrullah. 2009. “Ahmet Davutoglu: The Man behind Turkey's Assertive Foreign Policy” The Jamestown Foundation, March 25. Accessed January 13, 2011. http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=34754

January 2, 2011

WHAT TO EXPECT FROM TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN 2011

2011

Although there is an optimistic way of thinking on the behalf of Turkey’s foreign policy steps due to its growing influence in her Eastern borders or Obama administration’s efforts for restoring trust through phone calls, nobody can assure that 2011 will be an easy and comfortable year for Turkish state officials. The reason Turkey is emerging as a significant regional player is not that simply she is between West and East but her significant economic and diplomatic influence especially in the Middle East. It seems that 2011 will bring many topics in Turkish foreign policy agenda such as stability of Iraqi government, Israeli tension, Iranian nuclear proliferation, Armenia relations and European Union membership.

Since Ahmet Davutoglu came into power as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2009, Turkey adopted a “zero problem” strategy with its neighbors. This proactive change is a step forward for Turkey to a more influential attitude in the region but the economic advancements and relations with Middle East members tell us that zero problem policy is a product of economic motivations. Nevertheless, the search for a more stable and peaceful environment in her East would mean a lot for Turkey in 2011 especially in reestablishment in Iraq. Compared to European investors, Turkish companies seem more comfortable in doing business in risky atmosphere of Iraq. The continuity of the newly formed Iraqi government will be a key issue for advancements of Turkish industry in the post-war region and the Turkish government will be having an important role for developing relations with her Iraqi colleagues in 2011.

Tension with Israel seem not to be decreasing as Turkey’s demands for an apology and compensation for “Mavi Marmara” deaths will probably not be answered by the Israeli government. Although the history and context of Turkey-Israel relations is big enough not to be replaced easily, Turkish Prime Minister’s aggressive statements to Israel make him a popular figure in the Middle East countries and this motivation seems enough to stand firm in the confrontation. In addition, Iran’s nuclear proliferation is another sensitive issue for Turkey to act wisely as a nuclear-muscled Iran is a sure threat to Turkey more than to US or Europe. At the end of January, Turkey will host a United Nations Security Council meeting that is about sanctions on Iran and despite the fact that Turkey will not a have a word in the meetings, still it will be a good event to further the bilateral and multilateral relations about the issue.

Efforts to normalize relations with Armenia is another topic in the agenda which will help the region stabilize especially for energy transportation. Protocols and agreements in 2009 was a good step for both countries as it was a good way to silence the Armenian lobbies across the ocean. Still, Turkey insists for a resolution of disputes between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to further the negotiations. The solution in this issue is important due to the fact that Azerbaijan is a significant neighbor for Turkey as she is an energy partner supported with ties of kinship. Besides, Armenia relations have a sensitive reflection in EU membership as Armenia is included in European Neighborhood policy. Furthermore the weakening relations of Turkey and EU which leads many people think that Turkey is shifting to the East. The fact is, Croatia, that is started membership negotiations with Turkey in 2005, is planning to successfully close all the chapters of negotiations in the first part of 2011. On the contrary, Turkey only managed to close one of the chapters and this insufficiency may lead Turkey to form her policy accordingly and maybe permanently in 2011.

I intentionally did not mention the role of United States above since the long-lasting relationship between US and Turkey seems to continue necessarily due to Turkey’s position to support policies of US in the region. The year 2011 have enough reasons for Turkish Foreign Policy not to decrease the tempo of 2010. The influential and proactive role that Turkey adopted will bring a need for stability and peace not just outside but also inside the boundaries and it is for certain that the increasing number of issues and problems that are mentioned above can have either a restraining or propelling role in Turkish Foreign Policy in 2011.

TURNING TO THE EAST: ILLUSION OR REALITY?

2011

Nowadays it is very popular to observe Turkey’s new role as a politically mediating and economically influential country in the Middle East. Since Ahmet Davutoglu came into power as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2009, Turkey adopted a foreign policy called “zero problem with neighbors” and this policy needed a proactive approach from the Foreign Policy officials in political and economical grounds. Despite their rise in the region, Turkey is heavily questioned for if they are shifting towards East and leaving their Western tendency that is embraced since the foundation of the Turkish Republic. The New York Times writer Thomas Friedman, a three times Pulitzer winner, is one of the doubters and he expressed his fears of Turkey’s leaning towards East in his article called “Letter from Istanbul” on June 15, 2010.

What Friedman heavily underlines is that once an antidote to “Bin Ladenism” due to her secular and democratic but also Muslim approach, Turkey is now turning from West to East for sure and there are mainly three reasons for this transformation which are the negative attitude of European Union, the possibility of being the leader of the Arab world and the need for being strong inside the borders. Although I am convinced that there are reasonable points to believe that Turkey seems to be shifting, structural changes since the end of the cold war and the emerging economic activities of Turkey with her neighbors made people question the issue. These two points were in fact the steps for increasing the number of alternatives and enlarging the capabilities for Turkey which was once only the ally of the United States. To better explain my argument, I will be partly referring to the neo-realist perspective and articles from Kenneth Waltz, Mustafa Aydın and Dietrich Jung.

The main argument in Friedman’s mentioned article is change of approach adopted by Turkey in which he claims that “Turkey’s Islamist government seemingly focused not on joining the European Union but the Arab League”. That’s a bit exaggerated but what he means briefly is that Turkey is shifting from West to East. According to him, first reason for this change is the negative attitude of the EU in the aspect of membership of Turkey despite her efforts to match the conditions. Secondly, the absence of a leader country in the Middle East is a motivation for the Turkish government to turn his back to the West. It is certain that being in a confrontation with Israel brings a reputation to Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan. Lastly, the motivation to stay strong in the domestic sphere leads the government’s aggressive actions against the press and the army and acts for domestic popularity by accusing Israel in public speeches. My opinion for Turkey’s appearance of shifting East is different than Friedman’s, which I will explain through the structural changes and the growing economic relations of Turkey in the neighborhood.

To understand the international picture for the moment and Turkey’s position in it, we should first look at the neo-realist writings of Kenneth Waltz. He explains the international system as a composition of structures and interacting units (states) where every unit looks to care of his own. Waltz underlines that international politics is the realm of power and struggle and continues that the relations of units and the changes in the structure are two factors that are affected by each other to finally form a new system. “The structure of a system changes with changes in the distribution of capabilities across the system’s units” he writes, which brings us to Turkey’s efforts to maximize her capabilities by improving her relations with her neighbors. The last turning point in the 20th century is certainly the end of the Cold War which led the system from a bipolar to unipolar and finally to a multipolar stage. The US, the leader in the unipolarity, could not prevent the rise of regional alliances and new regional actors which brought us to a new distribution of capabilities.

I firmly believe that Turkish Foreign Policy is newly defining her role in this changed structure which led her to reposition herself between the West and the East. It seems that US has to compromise more than before, compared to the Cold War period aggressiveness of hers. That reestablishment is both the reason and the product of the newly emerging regional powers such as China, Russia, Brazil or Turkey. Turkey, once a pro-Western oriented country, is now trying to strengthen her hand by forming relationships with Russia, Iraq, Syria and Iran. Here I join Friedman’s thoughts that European Union’s unwillingness made Turkey look elsewhere which led not a leaning towards East in Turkish Foreign Policy but to an increasing alternatives and maximizing of benefits.

A proactive role in both diplomatic and economic spheres especially in the Middle East region seems to be the new approach but growing relations with Russia, Africa and the other parts of the world also cannot be denied. Though it is said to be the extension of Western approach, it is a fact that Turkey used to be an active member in the Middle East during 1950s when she was leading the Baghdad Pact and Middle East Defense Organization. So what makes people think that Turkey is different than before and closer to the East? The difference is the growing trade numbers and the interactions between Turkey and the Middle East countries. Turkey has enlarged his market enormously compared to the past and for now European Union countries are not the only buyers of Turkish products and services. Thus, Turkey is looking for a “zero problem” policy of stability and peace to further her economic relations with the East in a consistent way.

However I understand the concerns of the West about Turkey’s inclination to the East as the current Turkish government using an appropriate language and set of discourses to be engaged with the Middle East. As Jung tells in his article that Turkey was being perceived as a traitor in the region due to her Ottoman past of domination over Arabs and republican approach of adopting a secular system and redefining the role of Islam in the country. Today, Turkish government is seen as an Islam-oriented and conservative government with its proper set of behaviors and discourses. In addition, Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan is seen as a hero in the region after his speeches about the Turkey-Israel confrontation. Nevertheless, unlike Friedman, I would say that Turkey is not aiming to join the Arab league and leave the West but to increase the benefit, maximize the capability and create a suitable atmosphere for healthy economic relations. It is certain that abandoning relations with European countries would not maximize the capabilities of Turkey.

To summarize, I firmly believe that Turkey’s efforts of maximizing her capabilities and increasing the number of alternatives to interact cannot be seen as an inclination to the East as Thomas Friedman suggested in his article. In my opinion, structural changes since the end of the Cold War resulted in a new form of relations where the regional alliances and actors became influent. Furthermore, Turkey seems to be discovering her new role in the region newly and trying to be more proactive compared to past. This policy needs a more peaceful environment that will result in more stable economic relations between the countries in the region. It is for certain that Turkey cannot not leave Europe and the West in a heartbeat as some huge part of her roots lies in that hemisphere with a serious engagement of economic and diplomatic relations. I underline that Turkey’s turning back to East is just a illusion of her maximizing benefits and alternatives based on increasing diplomatic and economic relations with the Middle Eastern countries.

December 8, 2010

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EYES OF THE UNITED STATES

2010

On 28th of November 2010, Wikileaks, a voluntary organization that is aimed to reveal the secrets of governments to the public, started publishing documents of reports between US state officials, US bureaucrats and US embassies. Although it is active since 2007 and despite its successful revealing leaks on subjects like abuse and violation in Iraq and Afghanistan since then, no one (publicly and governmentally) discussed the organization’s efforts like that before. There are more than 250.000 documents to be published by Wikileaks and only a small portion of it was published since now which was enough to make a world-wide controversy. There are leaks from several US embassies in the world such as Madrid, Tel-Aviv or Buenos Aires but the Turkish Embassy of US in Ankara seems to be the Achilles’ heel as there are like 8.000 documents revealed from Ankara which is the biggest number among other embassies.

Throughout the published ones of 8.000 documents from Embassy Ankara, it can be seen that the aim of US officials in Ankara was to give an insight information of AKP government, bureaucrats and Turkey’s Foreign Policy approach to the US Secretary of State. There are some important comments about Turkish Foreign Policy in the documents, which are mainly focused on the arguable Neo-Ottoman posturing of Turkey based on her active diplomatic and economic efforts in the complex regions of Asia and Europe but especially in the Middle East. In this paper, I will evaluate a document written by Embassy Ankara on 20th January 2010 which is about Turkey’s recent foreign policy direction and its motivations.

To mention first, Ahmet Davutoglu, the Turkish Foreign Minister since May of 2009, is the leading figure in Turkey’s active foreign policy efforts. With his “zero-problem” policy, Turkey is looking for creating balance in the complicated atmosphere of Middle East. Turkish officials are aiming for a pivotal role in the region and for that reason they increased the frequencies of visits to Iraq, Iran, Syria and several Arab countries. Nevertheless the bounds with European Union and United States are not broken and as a result, one may say that Turkey is far from having a pure identity as she is stuck between West and East. However this complexity helps Turkey build a calculated value-maximizing effort in international relations. Simply, Middle East countries respect Turkey because of her link with the West and Western countries respect Turkey because of her link with the East.

In the article called 10ANKARA87, published by Wikileaks, the former US ambassador James Jeffrey draws not only a comprehensive but also a simple framework of the recent Turkish Foreign Policy in addition to possible complications for the US side. In the introduction part of his report, he emphasizes the emerging desire of Turkey to be independently proactive, supported with an Islamic orientation. He summarizes the recent appearance of Turkey which was mostly Western oriented in the past: “Does all this mean that the country is becoming more focused on the Islamist world and its Muslim tradition in its foreign policy? Absolutely. Does it mean that it is "abandoning" or wants to abandon its traditional Western orientation and willingness to cooperate with us? Absolutely not.”

In his report, Jeffrey writes about the recent disturbances of Turkish elites and European Union members about Turkey’s orientation toward the East and Islamization. According to Jeffrey’s hearings, Turkish elites seem to be disturbed of the possible drift from Western world and EU seems to be disturbed of being a part of AKP’s Christian vs Muslim or Europe vs Middle East separation campaign. However, Jeffrey never mentions about a disadvantage for US in this separation. Despite the fact that US never desires an Islam Republic in Turkey as their companionship is built upon the Western-oriented perspectives and institutions, Jeffrey welcomes the option of sharing responsibility of the region with Turkey. As a result, US does not react Turkey in a negative manner for using Islam as a tool or ideology as long as they stay strong enough to help Americans in the Middle East. However a loss of control, such as losing the air space or Incirlik base, would be unacceptable for US.

Furthermore, another aspect of the recent Turkey Foreign Policy that makes US uncomfortable is Turkey’s Neo-Ottoman posturing around the Middle East and the Balkans. There is a quote from Davutoglu’s thesis in the report: “the Balkans, Caucasus, and Middle East were all better off when under Ottoman control or influence; peace and progress prevailed. Alas the region has been ravaged by division and war ever since.” On the other hand, Jeffrey claims that despite her active foreign policy and economic growth, Turkey still does not have enough power to compete with the region’s leading states like US, Russia or Iran. According to him Turkey is in need of an underdog to call for a help from her and show her capabilities as a result. This is a very good observation and it should be added that until that time Turkey will still be in need of the protection and support of Western countries. Actually Jeffrey simply summarizes Turkey’s condition with a metaphor and describe Turkey as a Rover with Rolls Royce dreams.

What US really wants from Turkey, apart from calming down the tension with Israel, is to draw Syria from Iran and begin achieving practical results, not just phone calls and conversations. Turkey is in calm relations with Iran and not opposing her strictly due to the nuclear power issue makes Turkey the only major country that is in friendly discussion with Iran. In return, US expects from Turkey to benefit from this positive relationship and be more demanding from Iran in Security Council meetings, to stop her nuclear progress.

To sum up, it is obvious that the changing direction of the Turkish Foreign Policy is being carefully observed by the US officials. Their arguments are mostly reasonable and it seems that US will not be interfering in Turkey’s turning back to East, whether in a Neo-Ottoman posturing or not, as long as they do not let go of the Western traditions and companionship of US, which is not a rational choice by the way. Actually, James Jeffrey summarizes Turkey’s situation very well: “Turkey will remain a complicated blend of world class "Western" institutions, competencies, and orientation, and Middle Eastern culture and religion.”

November 29, 2010

CLOSER LOOK AT THE MISSILE SHIELD

2010

During his way to the Lisbon, where the NATO summit was going to take place, Turkish President Abdullah Gül shared his opinion with the reporters: “Outcomes of the Lisbon (summit) will determine the 10-15 years of NATO agenda.” During the meeting on 19th and 20th November, the most important decision, along with the efforts of expanding NATO-EU security collaboration in the sense of involving non-EU European countries, was the plantation of a missile shield in Europe and radar probably in Turkish territory. After this historic decision, there are now some questions on the table: Who is this shield for? Who will control it? Will it protect enough in exchange for that much investment? What are the benefits for Turkey?

Obviously, preventing Iran’s possible aggressive behaviors in the region is the primary aim to build the shield. Russia is another country that has the missile technology but as she is declared a companion of NATO, nobody puts her name next to Iran. Before and during the summit, due to her zero problem policy with neighbours, Turkey underlined the sensitivity of not to speak out any name of any country that can be the objective for the shield. Except an individual effort by the French president Sarkozy, every member country shared Turkey’s perception and as a result Turkey escaped a possible outpost role in the favor of US against Iran or Russia.

After the end of the Cold War, it was a popular thought that NATO was over as it had lost its objective following the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, it maintained its existence, this time against new threats like terrorist organizations, cyber attacks and aggressive states. The theories that NATO is an organization that executes the interests of US still have an heavy impact on the public opinion and this situation makes people wonder if the shield technology in Turkish territory would be controlled by US officials. According to the decisions taken in the summit, the responsibility will be shared by the NATO members equally.

In May 2010, two important physicians from MIT claimed that missile shield is a military myth as it cannot catch a nuclear missile with high success rate. They supported their arguments with the official reports published by the Pentagon which were about testing the related shield. During the tests, only 1 or 2 out of 10 missiles were hit by the shield and there had never been a real nuclear missile used in these practices. On the contrary, it is obvious that expectancy for the shield to be fully successful will be high since there will a large sum of money to be invested in the project. According to the plans, each NATO member, including the post-economic crisis states of EU, is going to give 200 million dollars each for the next ten years. However, there are rumours that the price will be higher, given that a similar US project cost for 45 billion dollars.

Everything about the missile shield issue resulted fine for Turkish officials’ side during the summit. Firstly, Turkey’s sensitivity about not to mention Iran as the shield’s objective was shared by all the members. Also, the change of missile shield coverage from East Europe to Turkey and whole Europe was a lucky and maybe a deserved move due to her positive foreign policy steps during the last couple of years. Furthermore, since there was a preparation of a Turkish missile shield for the upcoming years, the NATO project can be a chance to reduce the costs of this national one. Finally, possessing a shield project, although under the common control of members, would be a prestigious role for Turkey if correctly exercised.

To sum up, it is obvious that the decision to plant a missile shield in Europe is a chance for NATO to regenerate its influence following end of the Cold War. Although there are question marks against its high costs and ability to hit the target, still it is an important effort to form a security area over Turkey and European region. Additionally, the summit can be written as a success for Turkey as they persuaded all the members about the sensitivity not to mention Iran as an objective for the shield and they gained a chance to achieve an influential role due to their active involvement in the process.

November 19, 2010

REALITIES BEYOND OPTIMISM

2010

On 9th of November 2010, The European Commission published the progress report of Turkey and it seems that despite the optimistic atmosphere that is created by Turkey’s Chief Negotiator Egemen Bagis afterwards the publish, Turkey still needs a lot of time and effort to be accepted by European Union as a full member. Although nobody can ignore the fair progress that was succeeded by Turkish officials in certain areas (which is also underlined in the progress report of 2010), the two certain issues are on the table to be resolved: Full implantation of the Customs Union obligations with the EU and the progress towards the normalization of relations with Cyprus.

The first statement after the publish of progress report came from the Chief Negotiator Egemen Bagis: “This progress report is far more better than the one in 2009 which was the most positive report until that time. Now we can get the smell of EU membership.” It is pretty normal to hear such a statement from Egemen Bagis who is a dynamic and optimistic negotiator. But what needs to be done is to carefully examine the picture taken by the European Commission on behalf of the further progress that should be realized by Turkey. Yet, the tricky part is when you attempt to write down the pros and cons highlighted in the 2010 report, you see that, in nearly all lines, there has been a progress which is not sufficient enough.

According to the report, the political criteria is being sufficiently fulfilled by Turkey; thanks to the progress in public administration alongside with judiciary and fundamental rights with the approval of constitutional amendments in a referendum in 12th of September. Still, more efforts are needed on areas such as freedom of media and minority rights (fail of democratic opening for Kurdish people are emphasized). Moreover, in the economical aspects, growing market economy is praised in the report in spite of the continuing unemployment problem and external imbalances. Also the report shows that some laws and regulations that are to be aligned with EU’s are accomplished such as the State Aid Law which is a step towards the negotiations in the area of competition. Nevertheless, several number of developments are required in areas such as fisheries, social policies, justice and home affairs.

Beyond all these pros, cons and statements of “almost successful but not sufficient”, two crucial issues still stand in front of the EU membership of Turkey: First is the need for fully implementing the Customs Union obligations which in brief a large number of obstacles to be removed affecting EU products that are in free circulation. Second is the relations with Cyprus which in brief enabling direct transport links and allowing the free movement of goods with the island. Furthermore, the normalization of relations with Cyprus is vital as, in practical sense, the EU membership of Cyprus enables it to possibly object to the membership of Turkey.

Eventually, it should be remembered that only 13 of possible 33 acquis chapters of negotiations are opened and only one of them is closed. Nobody expects from Turkey to close all the chapters in the blink of an eye but if somebody is to get a smell of hope, he should be close to the table. No offense to the optimistic stance of Egemen Bagis but Commissioner Füle’s statements are also important as the demanding side is Turkey in this game: “Despite the progress in 2009, we are concerned that Turkey’s accession process is losing its momentum. The key to changing this is primarily with Turkey, which is expected to fully implement its current contractual relations with the EU –Customs Union- before it can gear up to full membership of the Union.”

October 27, 2010

LESS THAN A WIN-WIN IN AKKUYU

2010

Turkey’s foreign affair officials certainly have an agenda of short and long term plans. For now the foremost countries to be in concern and correlation are most probably United States, Iraq and Israel. Then comes European Union countries and Iran but certainly Russia is not among those first five. However, things may change in the future when the Russia-owned nuclear reactor in Turkey becomes real.

It was published in the Turkish Official Journal on 6th of October 2010 that Turkish and Russian officials sealed the deal for a nuclear reactor to be constructed in Akkuyu/Turkey by a joint stock of Russian companies that are to be agreed on in the near future. It is known that nuclear energy comes with its advantages and disadvantages but the details of the agreement bring more things to be concerned about.

According to the agreement, the Russian corporation is going to finish building the reactor and start the commercial activities in 10 years. What is catchy here is that Russians will hold all the rights and commercial shares of the reactor as long as it stands. It is reported that Russians are planning to sell the 49% of the shares to anyone interested but not one bit more. Also Turkey committed itself to purchase some large part of the electricity made by the Russian reactor for 15 years. According to the Union of Turkish Electrical Engineers, the construction of the reactor will not cost as cheap as it is predicted. Besides it will be more expensive to purchase electricity in a package for 15 years alongside its possible dependency effect.

Obviously nuclear power comes with a need of technical know-how and Turkey doesn’t have that. This inability would cost one way or another and Turkish officials chose a way in which Russia will play a major part. Although possessing a nuclear reactor is a nearly “must” for the regional power candidates in Middle East, it may be less than a win-win situation for Turkey. Before the commercial-related articles and their numerical details in the agreement, one can think the possibility of Turkey’s increasing dependency on Russia which also provides most of the natural gas need of Turkey. It is quite satirical when one can see that nuclear power is a way for its owners to be less dependent on other energy providers.

It is interesting that Russia also have plans to build a nuclear reactor in Venezuela which seems very similar to the Turkish plan. This may bring us to the point that Russians may not be planning only commercial activity with the nuclear know-how they own. When we think of the geopolitical standings of Turkey and Venezuela, it would be naïve to see the ongoing process only in commercial framework. As a result, it can be concluded that it may be prestigious and intimidating for Turkey in the future to have a nuclear reactor in their own land for the existing regional power conflict and but it is a more “win” in the Russian side if that is a win-win situation.

October 21, 2010

ACTING ACCORDINGLY AND THROUGH IMPROVISATION

2010

In the spring of 2010, Ibrahim Tatlises, a famous Turkish singer and showman, signed an agreement of a construction project in Erbil, Iraq. Tatlises will be investing in this project with a share of 50% and 70.000 houses will be built at the end of it. Tatlises is not only a singer in his hometown but also a businessman with his investments in sectors like food, clothing and broadcasting. But that’s not the case. The case is not the investment of a Turkish singer in Iraq. This micro example is only a shiny part of the increasing Turkish investment in Iraq and mostly in Kurdish Regional Government in Northern Iraq.

According to the regional administration in Northern Iraq, 730 out of 1,217 foreign companies in Iraq (mostly in Arbil, Sulaymaniyah and Duhok) are Turkish investments. A large portion of these companies are from construction and trade sectors which briefly signals the needs of the post-war Iraqi society. Also the trade numbers show the importance of Turkish goods in the region. There is a 6 billion dollars of trade between two countries and 5,2 billion of it is Turkey’s exports which are generally textile and ready-wear goods.

It is obvious that both these countries make profits from this cooperation. Turkey is now the most important importer for Iraq with a rate of 25% and this cooperation helps Turkey to continue its ongoing positive domestic economic atmosphere. On the other hand, Iraq severely needs huge and various investments due to its devastated post-war conditions and Turkey is one of the biggest contributors. Moreover, this transaction also helps Iraq build a more stable state. Turkey has a policy of “zero problem with neighbors” and Turkish state officials are very keen to give hand to Iraqi people for a stable, reliable and peaceful environment in their South Eastern region. But the most crucial point here is that Turkey is becoming a prominent actor in the Middle East region as a result of this cooperation.

According to the theories, after the withdrawal of US troops through the end of the 2011 there will be a power gap in Iraq. Shias, Sunnis and Kurds are the most influential groups in the country. After the withdrawal, Shias might be looking for support from Iran and Sunnis from the Arab world. It seems that Turkey is the most suitable candidate for the “brother” role for Kurds and the ongoing economic cooperation is also a way for building an increasing level of understanding for further cooperation between these two neighbors. Turkish state officials shows their good intentions by opening up new consulships in Iraq and this means another step for the development of good relations between the two sides.

The Turkish Businessman’s Association (TBA) seems to be sharing and maintaining this ambition. In April 2010, the members of the association met with Mesud Barzani, the president of the Kurdish Regional Government. After the meeting, Umit Boyner, president of TBA, pointed out the importance of the relationship between the two countries: “Legal and political environment along with the investment conditions of the region are noteworthy for us. The integrity of this country is precious to Turkey." It seems that all the actors in the stage are performing their actings according to the script and good news is that they also know how to improvise. Even a Turkish singer knows where to invest and this means more than it seems for the future actings in the region.
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