TURNING TO THE EAST: ILLUSION OR REALITY?

2011

Nowadays it is very popular to observe Turkey’s new role as a politically mediating and economically influential country in the Middle East. Since Ahmet Davutoglu came into power as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2009, Turkey adopted a foreign policy called “zero problem with neighbors” and this policy needed a proactive approach from the Foreign Policy officials in political and economical grounds. Despite their rise in the region, Turkey is heavily questioned for if they are shifting towards East and leaving their Western tendency that is embraced since the foundation of the Turkish Republic. The New York Times writer Thomas Friedman, a three times Pulitzer winner, is one of the doubters and he expressed his fears of Turkey’s leaning towards East in his article called “Letter from Istanbul” on June 15, 2010.

What Friedman heavily underlines is that once an antidote to “Bin Ladenism” due to her secular and democratic but also Muslim approach, Turkey is now turning from West to East for sure and there are mainly three reasons for this transformation which are the negative attitude of European Union, the possibility of being the leader of the Arab world and the need for being strong inside the borders. Although I am convinced that there are reasonable points to believe that Turkey seems to be shifting, structural changes since the end of the cold war and the emerging economic activities of Turkey with her neighbors made people question the issue. These two points were in fact the steps for increasing the number of alternatives and enlarging the capabilities for Turkey which was once only the ally of the United States. To better explain my argument, I will be partly referring to the neo-realist perspective and articles from Kenneth Waltz, Mustafa Aydın and Dietrich Jung.

The main argument in Friedman’s mentioned article is change of approach adopted by Turkey in which he claims that “Turkey’s Islamist government seemingly focused not on joining the European Union but the Arab League”. That’s a bit exaggerated but what he means briefly is that Turkey is shifting from West to East. According to him, first reason for this change is the negative attitude of the EU in the aspect of membership of Turkey despite her efforts to match the conditions. Secondly, the absence of a leader country in the Middle East is a motivation for the Turkish government to turn his back to the West. It is certain that being in a confrontation with Israel brings a reputation to Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan. Lastly, the motivation to stay strong in the domestic sphere leads the government’s aggressive actions against the press and the army and acts for domestic popularity by accusing Israel in public speeches. My opinion for Turkey’s appearance of shifting East is different than Friedman’s, which I will explain through the structural changes and the growing economic relations of Turkey in the neighborhood.

To understand the international picture for the moment and Turkey’s position in it, we should first look at the neo-realist writings of Kenneth Waltz. He explains the international system as a composition of structures and interacting units (states) where every unit looks to care of his own. Waltz underlines that international politics is the realm of power and struggle and continues that the relations of units and the changes in the structure are two factors that are affected by each other to finally form a new system. “The structure of a system changes with changes in the distribution of capabilities across the system’s units” he writes, which brings us to Turkey’s efforts to maximize her capabilities by improving her relations with her neighbors. The last turning point in the 20th century is certainly the end of the Cold War which led the system from a bipolar to unipolar and finally to a multipolar stage. The US, the leader in the unipolarity, could not prevent the rise of regional alliances and new regional actors which brought us to a new distribution of capabilities.

I firmly believe that Turkish Foreign Policy is newly defining her role in this changed structure which led her to reposition herself between the West and the East. It seems that US has to compromise more than before, compared to the Cold War period aggressiveness of hers. That reestablishment is both the reason and the product of the newly emerging regional powers such as China, Russia, Brazil or Turkey. Turkey, once a pro-Western oriented country, is now trying to strengthen her hand by forming relationships with Russia, Iraq, Syria and Iran. Here I join Friedman’s thoughts that European Union’s unwillingness made Turkey look elsewhere which led not a leaning towards East in Turkish Foreign Policy but to an increasing alternatives and maximizing of benefits.

A proactive role in both diplomatic and economic spheres especially in the Middle East region seems to be the new approach but growing relations with Russia, Africa and the other parts of the world also cannot be denied. Though it is said to be the extension of Western approach, it is a fact that Turkey used to be an active member in the Middle East during 1950s when she was leading the Baghdad Pact and Middle East Defense Organization. So what makes people think that Turkey is different than before and closer to the East? The difference is the growing trade numbers and the interactions between Turkey and the Middle East countries. Turkey has enlarged his market enormously compared to the past and for now European Union countries are not the only buyers of Turkish products and services. Thus, Turkey is looking for a “zero problem” policy of stability and peace to further her economic relations with the East in a consistent way.

However I understand the concerns of the West about Turkey’s inclination to the East as the current Turkish government using an appropriate language and set of discourses to be engaged with the Middle East. As Jung tells in his article that Turkey was being perceived as a traitor in the region due to her Ottoman past of domination over Arabs and republican approach of adopting a secular system and redefining the role of Islam in the country. Today, Turkish government is seen as an Islam-oriented and conservative government with its proper set of behaviors and discourses. In addition, Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan is seen as a hero in the region after his speeches about the Turkey-Israel confrontation. Nevertheless, unlike Friedman, I would say that Turkey is not aiming to join the Arab league and leave the West but to increase the benefit, maximize the capability and create a suitable atmosphere for healthy economic relations. It is certain that abandoning relations with European countries would not maximize the capabilities of Turkey.

To summarize, I firmly believe that Turkey’s efforts of maximizing her capabilities and increasing the number of alternatives to interact cannot be seen as an inclination to the East as Thomas Friedman suggested in his article. In my opinion, structural changes since the end of the Cold War resulted in a new form of relations where the regional alliances and actors became influent. Furthermore, Turkey seems to be discovering her new role in the region newly and trying to be more proactive compared to past. This policy needs a more peaceful environment that will result in more stable economic relations between the countries in the region. It is for certain that Turkey cannot not leave Europe and the West in a heartbeat as some huge part of her roots lies in that hemisphere with a serious engagement of economic and diplomatic relations. I underline that Turkey’s turning back to East is just a illusion of her maximizing benefits and alternatives based on increasing diplomatic and economic relations with the Middle Eastern countries.

BEING A WORLD POWER: ILLUSIONS AND REALITIES

2009

Years after the Second World War (1939-1945), it was understood that the year 1945 meant not only the end of war but also the start of a period when new power structures were being shaped and new world powers were being emerged. It is also the year that signifies the beginning of Britain’s imperial power impoverish which was realized years later. In this paper, considering the 1946-1961 period, I will try to show why Britain changed her mind to join the European Economic Community in 1961 which she once ignored to be a part of.

My theory is that once an imperial world power, Britain could not protect her place after the Second World War (WWII) and in the time of emerging new powers that are US and USSR, she decided to link herself with the newly rising European Economic Community to strengthen her position. Throughout the paper, to support my theory, there will be several points to be emphasized such as how US and USSR became world powers after the Second World War; in which circumstances Britain lost its imperial power and how European countries gathered together and established an economically and in some respect politically rising community that grabbed attention of Britain.

In the beginning, to understand the spirit of the time, we should look closely at the post-war surroundings. After the WWII, when European countries were in poor conditions both physically and morally, many people expected Britain to take the lead in reorganizing Europe because of her wartime role (Urwin 2007, p. 18). In spite of that, Britain was highly negative about any form of integration with other European countries mostly counting on their proud wartime role and history of sovereignty-first perspective. Their understanding of foreign policy was based on relations with US and Commonwealth countries and not with devastated European countries which could possibly distract her from being a self-independent world power (Dinan 2004, p. 24). In addition, this solitary perspective of Britain can be testified from the first hand which is the British President of the time, Winston Churchill.

In 1946, Winston Churchill gave a speech at Zurich University where he clearly showed the road map of his country: “The first step is to form a Council of Europe (…) In all this urgent work, France and Germany must take the lead together. Great Britain, the British Commonwealth of Nations, mighty America and Soviet Russia must be the friends and sponsors of the new Europe” (Nelsen and Stubb 2004, p. 11). Although Britain showed European countries some courage, in reality they were in need of the political leadership of Britain, due to her post-war confidence and prestige. Certainly it was a tactical mistake of British headquarters to stay passive which they paid for most years to come where US and USSR became replacing world powers (Mander 1963, p. 188).

To describe how US gained her world power status while getting rid of her isolationist policies, two striking approaches should be carefully examined. One of them was the Marshall aids, which was to help European countries that were ruined economically after the WWII. By the help of this recovery program, US was looking to establish a solid market ground for her exports by gaining companionship of European countries (ENA, Historical Events). Another initiative by US was North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) which was formed for the aim of military alliance, whereby United States were now committed to Western Europe’s defense and so that continental Europeans were less dependent militarily on Britain (Dinan 2004, p. 36).

On the other hand, in the Eastern Europe, Soviet Russia already proved herself as a militarily strong country by standing still against the Nazis in the WWII. Moreover, their expansionist and aggressive ideas over Western Europe which were also supported by the rising communism ideology and her superior technological advancements comparing with the continent made them one of the Cold War actors alongside with the US. These formations were leading the world to a politically bipolarized form for many years to come which is also indicating the point I will come in the upcoming paragraphs: the decline of the Britain as a world power.

The political and economic contradictions and competition between the Cold War actors, the US and the USSR, led to not only a geographically but also a politically compressed Europe. Before coming to the reasons of Britain’s decline, I see a necessity to explain how European unification is shaped and caught attention of Britain in the late 1950s. First of all, one possible outside stimulus that brought weakened post-war countries of Europe together was the Cold War contention between US and USSR, which was fueled by initiatives such as Marshall Plan and NATO of US and the offensive and expansionist ideas of the Soviets (Mander 1963, p. 184).

Nevertheless, it was the decision and determination of European countries to form a unification that might lead them to a fresh exit from the economically and physically obscure atmosphere of that time. Consequently, the idea of supranational authority was accepted one way or another and after several theoretical debates European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was formed with the pioneering cooperation of France and Germany to help the continent compose an economically more stable ground (Urwin 2007, p. 18). This alliance continued under the formations of European Economic Community (EEC) and Euratom owing to the agreement named Treaty of Rome in 1957 (Lee 1996, p. 283).

In a narrow perspective, it can be seen that the main objective of European Unification was to provide an economical integration so the member countries might get better conditions under the regulations that facilitate the commercial relations. But more than that, although the agreements were made under the topic of “economics”, the long term aim was to establish the political unification of Western Europe (Shanks and Lambert 1962, p. 165). As a result European nations had embarked on a road which would lead in the end to all major economic and also political decisions being made on behalf of Europe as a whole (Beddington-Behrens 1966, p. 18). In addition, it was the start of a century, which was already suffered enough of wars, that economical power was now the heart of having a strong political position in the world. This unification process of European continent led to an economical and political rise in 1950s whereby Britain’s power was waning as a consequence of her post-war tactical mistakes and illusions of still being an independent world power (Hörber 2006, p. 340).

While European countries were unifying to form an economical and political influence and the US and the USSR were emerging as newly world powers, Britain, on the other hand, was experiencing a declining process which can be plainly portrayed by the consequences of two main incidents: Decolonization of Commonwealth countries and Suez Crisis. First to mention, decolonization process of Asian and African countries, which generally took place in 1940s and 1950s, was mostly encouraged by the post-war international climate and the two anti-colonialist superpowers, the US and the USSR (ENA, Historical Events).

As the perception of economically counting upon the colonized Commonwealth countries was in the core of their politics, the most effected world power from this independence trend was Britain. Not only she lost her links with countries like India that she trusted in political issues but also she lost her strength in overseas markets while the newly independent countries started to link commercial links with countries other than Britain (Lee 1996, p. 290). The United States, the anti-colonialist and triggering power of the independence trend, was now the main commercial partner of former Commonwealth countries owing to her highly developed economy and large population of 180 million people (Beddington-Bahrens 1966, p. 133).

While decolonization process of Commonwealth countries is indicating the decline of Britain’s economic power, Suez Crisis shows how Britain lost its world power status through the political consequences of the incident. After Egypt’s decision to nationalize the Suez Canal in 1956, Britain and France sent troops to Egypt to gain control of the canal. Although they were militarily successful, they had to leave the Suez Canal due to the threat of nuclear bombings to London and Paris by the anti-colonialist Soviet Union. Likewise, despite being the traditional allies of the European powers, the United States did not appreciate this kind of neo-colonial diplomacy and used extreme financial and diplomatic pressure on British government through the United Nations (ENA, Historical Events). The obvious conclusion that the Suez Crisis exposed was that Britain, alongside with France, was no longer a world power, being beaten by the US and the USSR on political, economical, technological and martial circumstances (Hörber 2006, 340).

Contrasting to newly emerged world powers which are the US and the USSR and the significance of the recently unifying European countries through several economic agreements such as the Common Market, Britain soon realized that she had to increase her activities in economical aspects. After several failed attempts of Britain to make economic arrangements and form a free trade area with the six countries of the Common Market, she later established the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) with non-members of the EEC which are Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland (Dinan 2005, p. 44).

But the outcomes of the EFTA was not like Britain had desired as the EFTA members were vitally interested in trading with the rest of the world and were looking for a more integrated European market (Beddington-Behrens 1966, p. 48). In the meantime, EEC members continued their closer economical integration. As a result, the lacking free access of Britain to the necessary European markets made her notice that she could not compete with the EEC since her economical performance were far less than the members of the union (Lee 1996, p. 290).

In this atmosphere of changing power structures, Britain had to replace herself in the updated political and economical senses, in a different direction than before (Lloyd 1986, p. 373) One of the options, the most probable one which helped me construct my theory, was joining the EEC which was establishing its political unity increasingly out of economical integration. In a political atmosphere in which new and greater world powers were emerged, Britain had to change her existing perception and take a different way to stop her weakening in the political issues. Continental Europe was now a political force which Britain had to reckon and eventually she applied for membership to the EEC in 1961 (Urwin 2007, p. 24).

One question can be asked: Was joining the EEC the only option that Britain had to improve her political and economical status? Apparently it was the most sensible decision Britain made in the period of 15 years. Other than joining the EEC, one option could be strengthening links with her historical partner, the US. However it was irrational that the US, in the process of the Suez Crisis, had already shown her desire to be a world power alone without the help of Britain. On the other hand, although the USSR were showing a good perspective of being a partner that was technologically and militarily rising, the main reason that Britain had stayed away from her was the ideological difference, considering the Communist regime of the Soviets (ENA, Historical Events). The last option might be to strengthen ties with the Commonwealth countries again while it was obvious that the independence trend led an irreversible change of character for the former member nations. In the end, Britain could not reproduce her former devoted relations with the newly-independent nations anymore.

After the WWII it was the passive and non-involving presence of Britain which made a decrease in her world power. Success of the new EEC institutions alongside with the economical arrangements were the positive consequences of European countries’ progressive approaches to take their fate into their own hands, which Britain could not match. When it was most needed for her own benefit, not taking an active role in world politics and on the contrary continuing her conservative policies and unenthusiastic point of view for a supranational authority, changed Britain’s formerly esteemed position in the world politics and it was a necessity to alter her mind and apply to be a partner of EEC members where a chance of political and economical progress might appear eventually.


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