"The power of accurate observation is commonly called cynicism by those who have not got it." George Bernard Shaw

Showing posts with label EU. Show all posts
Showing posts with label EU. Show all posts

January 25, 2011

TURKEY’S EU MEMBERSHIP IN RATIONALIST AND LIBERAL APPROACHES

2011

Introduction

The negotiations between Turkey and European Union (EU) on the Turkish membership goes back to the 1959 when Turkey first applied for the associate membership. Since then, in more than 50 years, 21 new members joined the Union but Turkey only managed to be a official candidate in 1999 and start the negotiations in 2005. As the EU evolved through time with the joining of new members from different regions and traditions of the continent, it had to adopt new policies, institutions and arrangements to better absorb the new structure of the community. Alongside, there had been many theories that observed and analyzed the structures of the Union such as neo-realist, liberal intergovernmentalist and constructivist understandings.

My thesis is that Turkey deserves to be a member of the European Union which can be justified in rationalist (neo-realist and liberal intergovernmentalist) and constructivist approaches. Throughout the paper, first you will find a brief historical analyses of European Enlargement processes to better understand the progress it had experienced. In the second part, there will be a summary of Turkey – EU relations alongside with a brief summary of recent Turkish Foreign Policy direction. Next, there will be an analysis of theories, which are neo-realist, liberal intergovernmentalist and constructivist approaches, about European Union’s enlargement and integration processes with a perspective on Turkey’s membership on related topics. Finally, after having established the base for the thesis, you will read how I defend my thesis that Turkey deserves to be a member of the European Union in rationalist and constructivist perspectives.

I. History of European Union Enlargement

Before understanding the conceptions of integration and enlargement theories in EU and its relations with Turkey’s membership status, a brief summary of previous enlargement rounds that Europeans experienced should be drawn. It is certain that EU is not the same union as it was in 1950s, due to its ongoing change which includes both deepening in institutional means and widening in the means of new members. There were only 6 members when the union was first founded and there are now 27 EU members which means a geographically stretched and fundamentally evolved community. The enlargement rounds from 1973 to 2007 can be summed up in four headings: The United Kingdom (UK), Denmark and Ireland enlargement in 1973, Mediterranean enlargement in 1980s, EFTA enlargement in 1995 and finally the Central and Eastern European enlargement in 2004 and 2007.

To start with, there were, reasonable or not, economical and political reasons for UK not to join the group of founding countries that are France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and Netherlands and sign Treaty of Paris in 1952. Until 1961, British thoughts were to ignore the European countries due to economical reasons as the European Economic Community (EEC) can be a burden for British and political reasons as UK was still an imperial power (Nugent 2004, 22). However, political developments that are the rise of United States and Soviet Union as the new world powers and its reflections in Suez Crises and developments in economical relations among the EC members led the British officials rethink to join the community. After two de Gaulle rejections in 1961 and 1967, UK became a member in 1971. What motivated the existing members to accept UK were its possible contribution to the EC budget and the new market opportunities. Denmark and Ireland were other new members in the 1971 enlargement which was only the beginning of the ongoing enlargement rounds.

Second enlargement rounds is also called the Mediterranean enlargement as the new members were Greece in 1981 and Portugal and Spain in 1986. All three countries experienced dictatorships in 1970s and were trying to improve their standards following the democratization progress. What was significant about the acceptance of Greece were her very low rates of economical and political progress compared to the other members’ at that time (Nugent 2004, 27). The underlying motivation of member countries’ acceptance was to help Greece improve politically and economically with the support of the community norms to be reached. There are many thoughts that put nowadays’ Turkey parallel to Greece at that 1980s and claim that same tolerance can be shown to Turkey in order to help them improve their political and economical standards. However, today’s EU has more members than before which means a more difficult transaction on behalf of deepening in institutional and bureaucratic norms. In addition, it is very much argued shared history of Greece and European culture and the motivation to foster development in Greece drove their membership progress in a positive manner (Greece MFA 2011).

Third enlargement also has another name which is the EFTA enlargement as former EFTA members that are Austria, Finland and Sweden had joined the community in 1995. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and following the end of the Cold War, those three countries did not have a tendency to be neutral as before. The significance of this round was its quick and smooth progress due to the candidates’ already adjusted standards to the Union. The result was very positive as neither of the three countries were that huge to cause a major policy change and they all brought a Scandinavian culture of political transparency and democracy to the existing grounds of the Union (Nugent 2004, 30). Also to note that other EFTA members, which are Norway, Iceland and Switzerland, did not became a member because of the negative results in their referendum concerning the membership.

The last enlargement round that happened in 2004 and 2007, when 12 countries from Central and Eastern Europe (CEEC) joined the Union, was also an extension of the collapse of the Soviet union similar to the previous round. The major motivation of CEEC was to reintegrate to the Western Europe through the EU membership. On behalf of the Union, the major reasons were to establish a soft security sphere around the continent and incorporate the new markets to the existing economical relations (Nugent 2004, 35). Although these 12 countries had low GDP rates and the entrance bar to the Union became higher due to the increased numbers of acquis they nevertheless achieved to be accepted as members. However, this round made many thinkers question the future of the Union as it became more difficult to get deeper in the policy changes and institutional formations (Aggestam 2008, 360). Nevertheless, it was a giant step for both sides and the future formations will tell us if the decision was right.

In a rationalist approach, many think that the calculations of the cons and pros led existing members to accept the candidate countries as new members. New market opportunities, security issues or the desire to be a stronger political power in the world seem to suppress the doubts about the enlargements due to the low GDPs of the recent members (in the second and fourth rounds) or the possibility of fragmentation in policy areas and institutional organizations. The initiatives like Copenhagen Criteria, standards for candidate countries to reach, seem like a justifiable and acceptable approach to establish a more systematic understanding in enlargement but the reality is the evolution of the community’s former primitive role to the recent sophisticated situation.

II. Turkey – EU Relations and Turkey’s Recent Foreign Policy

Turkey’s EU membership journey starts in 1959 when the first application was done to be an associate member. Since the Turkish Republic was founded in 1923, the founders had a western-oriented approach but the related progress of Turkey in 20th century should be observed with its relevance to the Cold War period and subsequent Turkish foreign policy direction. Turkey’s memberships of Council of Europe in 1949 and of NATO in 1952 can be shown as evidences alongside her alliance with the United States and Western Europe during the Cold War. As Turkey was very close to the aggressive attitudes of the Soviet Union and complexity of the developing countries of the Middle East, she found herself close to the Western world of development as a path to increase her stability and improve her standards. Although, her geographical closeness to Asia along with the Ottoman past and religious background Turkey usually came face to face with obstacles other than economical and political standards.

The application in 1959 resulted as the Ankara agreement in 1964 which recognized Turkey’s desire to be a part of the European Community which can be achieved in the future, not at that time. What Turkey aimed also was her desire to weaken her dependency on the US but due to the low levels of development in competitive economy and high import substitution at that time, Turkey could not get a positive return from the EC. The 1970s was a period called “the self-exclusion” (Öniş 2000, 12) of Turkey from the membership when the domestic issues kept the country busy and she found her NATO membership enough against a possible Soviet threat. Also Turkish officials are said to have adopted a defensive attitude for their premature market conditions against the European competitiveness. Furthermore, the membership application of Greece in 1975 was underestimated and the possibility of their negative role against a Turkish candidacy as a member in the future was not foreseen (Öniş 2000, 11).

The military coup in 1980 led to a frozen relationship between the two sides and it continued until the application for full membership in 1987. What Turkey accomplished was a liberal economy, privatizations and increasing democracy level compared to past made the atmosphere more optimistic than before (Arıkan 2006, 86). But the Europeans did not share the same optimism and although they wished for Turkey’s good run for the future talks, they returned with negative comments due to the poor relations with Greece and the existing conflict in Cyprus. What actually disturbed the EC was the possibility of disharmony that Turkey’s membership would create as the community was becoming a political power after the Single European Act was signed in 1987. Other negative factors such as the large population, low development, high unemployment rates and poor indicators in human rights, rule of law and minority rights in Turkey made inappropriate ground for membership (ESI 2006).

The change in relations began in 1995 with the membership of Turkey in Customs Union and the acceptance of candidacy in Helsinki Summit in 1999 (EUSG 2007). The prominent reasons of this change during that time were the reforms made by the Turks (i.e. removal of death penalty), improving relations with Greece and the lobbying of US for Turkey to become a EU member. Although there was talks of possible partnership models instead of full membership status, Turkey officially started accession negotiations in 2005 to reach the standards of the Union that are drawn by the Copenhagen Criteria. However the negotiations did not go well until now as only 1 of the 35 chapters, that determine the capability of candidate’s membership, has been successfully closed by Turkey (EUSG 2007). On the other hand, Turkey seems to have adopted a new foreign policy which makes her to increase the alternatives of alliances in the East with Middle Eastern and Caucasian countries, alongside with the US, the continual ally.

It is remarkable that Turkey’s decreasing interest in EU membership and her increasing regional role in the Middle East seems to occur at the same time. The increasing political and economical influence of Turkey in the Middle East does not necessarily mean a shift from West to the East but her low level of performance in closing the chapters for EU membership makes people question if Turkey is aiming to be a leader in the East instead of being a part of the European Union and West. Since Ahmet Davutoglu became the new Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2009, Turkey adopted a “zero problem with neighbors” policy that aims to establish stability and peace in the region to foster the economic relations (Uslu 2009). As a result of the increasing economical relations with Middle Eastern countries, Turkey started to seem like an East-oriented country although the ties with the West are never split completely. Thus, increasing economical relations with neighbors and increasing the alternatives brought a chance for Turkish officials to become more active in political relations. This approach of Turkish Foreign Policy, which is increasing alternatives and maximizing benefits, is very close to be understood with a rationalist and neo-realist perspective.

III. Theories on European Enlargement and Integration and Turkey’s Membership

Before analyzing theories on the enlargement and integration issues, the question “What is Europe?” should be asked in order to be able to understand the concept of Europe and European Union. Should Europe be defined according to its geographical space which does not have a clear-cut border like Americas have? After the collapse of the Soviet Union, several former Soviet and/or Eastern/Central countries are accepted as European Union members. So does it mean that they each became a European country after the collapse of the Soviet Union? No, the answer is that even Russia, whose former geographical location is very much called the East, can be a “European” in the future. Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia are all in the east side of Turkey and considered as European according to the European Union’s Eastern Partnership Program (EEAS 2011). So, a geographical definition is a very difficult one to explain the borders of Europe and the boundaries of the EU does not exactly answer our question.

As Delanty writes, Europe is a cultural contestation and manifestation of a European modernity and civilization which means that every country, organization or unit that contributes to that culture is also a part of it (Delanty and Rumford 2005, 52). There is a diversity of civilizations in the European geography which is, at the same time, an area of civilizations that foster each other in time. Thus, Delanty summarizes as there is more than one Europe (Delanty and Rumford 2005, 37). What is interesting about the image of European Union is that people are inclined to think EU as the pure reflection of Europe which, in my opinion, is a mistake. This phenomenon’s fallacy has already been proven after the end of the Cold War and the joining of Central and Eastern European countries to the Union that is to represent Europe. Thus, Europe is not necessarily defined with its borders but it would be proper to think about the perspectives and related patterns that are brought by thinkers. There are many theories for European enlargement and integration which focus on political or economical factors with different perspectives such as neo-realist, liberal intergovernmentalist and constructivist.

• Neo-realist Approaches and Related Explanations for Turkey - EU Relations

To better understand the neo-realist approach and analyze the foundation of EU and its relations with Turkey accordingly, we should have a look at the writing of Kenneth Waltz. As Waltz explains that the international system is a composition of structures and interacting units (states) where every unit looks to care of his own (Waltz 1979, 79). The main aim of the units is to survive in the anarchical structure where you have to maximize your capabilities and overcome the power struggles. According to this theory, every country looks to behave in a rational way which is to survive and secure herself in the anarchical environment of world. Thus, the idea of cooperation is very possible for states to come together and form an alliance in order to decrease their vulnerability against other, to increase their capability and to achieve a balance of power. As a result, from a neo-realist perspective, states come together to cooperate to maintain their survival in the anarchical international arena (Pollack 2000, 3).

When we look at the founding principles of the European Union, it is obvious that the main aim was to create a sphere of cooperation to increase capabilities and decrease vulnerabilities. The result of the World War II was devastating for the continent and every country, including France and Germany, needed time and money to reconstruct both physically and mentally. As a result, the European Coal and Steel Community was founded by 6 European countries to increase the economical relations among them and accelerate the reconstruction. The political status and identity of today’s European Union was not an immediate aim for the founders which was fostered parallel to the economic developments of the community. A neo-realist approach would claim that what pushed these countries was, other than economical reasons, to stay together against the two leading countries of the anarchical system, the United States and the Soviet Union.

The significant thing is that the European Community maintained its presence after the end of the Cold War which was an important reason to bring them together. Yet, their integration and enlargement continued in instances like adopting the single currency in Maastricht Treaty in 1992 or adopting a qualified majority voting in Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 which both strengthened the union’s institutional role (Pollack 2000, 2). The end of the Cold War does not necessarily mean the end of the anarchical system that is described in the neo-realist approach. Nevertheless, the member states, which are to be the units seeking their own benefit, gradually developed an understanding of a European community that is not only to survive but to be collectively another polar in the multi-polarity of the post-cold war period.

To implement a rationalist approach of neo-realist theory into the Turkey’s EU membership, we should look at the cons and pros of the cooperation and decide on whether it is enough to explain the progress between the two sides in a neo-realist view. There are many advantages for EU to accept Turkey as a member and one of them is the Turkey’s capability to maintain the security. Turkish army is NATO’s second largest (The Economist 2006) and it is no doubt that her possible membership is a great asset for the European Security and Defense Policy. Furthermore, Turkey’s geographical position makes her an important spot as she is both linked with Caucasus, Middle East and the Mediterranean area. What makes Turkey an important regional actor is her shared history of bureaucracy and religion with the Middle Eastern countries. According to the neo-realist approach, states seek for their survival and security and adopt policies accordingly. Turkey is still in the same geographical area as she was in 1959 when she did her first application and she had approximately the same strong military approach at that time.

Thus, the rational approach of neo-realists in enlargement seems to be wrong on behalf of the Turkey’s membership issue. It seems proper when we think of the Eastern European countries’ acceptance as they provide a soft security with their membership. The former Soviet states accepted to be the safe-zone with their presence between the existing members and the East in exchange for their acceptance to the Union. On the other hand, Turkey has the similar, maybe more, offers for security and stability concerning the Caucasus and the Middle East in exchange for being an EU member. However, 50 years have passed since the first application of Turkey and it seems that it is not possible to accept the neo-realist approach alone to understand the enlargement of the European Union.

• Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approaches and Related Explanations for Turkey – EU Relations

Similar to neo-realist theorists’ rationalist approaches, liberal intergovernmentalists also share the rationalist understanding but other than a security level. They see the relationships of member countries in an economical perspective and assume that the economical interdependence among the countries makes war an unbeneficial choice (Pollack 2000, 4). Neo-realists claimed that the European countries unified due to the anarchical structures of the Cold War period and according to their approach their unity had to be ended after the end of it. However, European Union continues its journey in the post-cold war period. What liberals argue is that the shared values of democracy and existing commercial linkages between the member countries are the reasons that hold members together (Pollack 2000, 4).

As Pollack refers to Andrew Moravcsik that liberal intergovernmentalism has three steps: “a liberal theory of national preference formation, intergovernmental theory of bargaining and a new theory of institutional choice stressing the importance of credible commitments.” (Pollack 2000, 11). Against the security underlining of the realist approaches, liberals underline the economical relations of states which are related to domestic spheres are the basis for the relations. Thus states’ domestic preferences leads to a bargaining process among them which make international institutions as some kind of tools to arrange the relations of preferences between the states.

When we look at the liberal-intergovernmentalist approach on European Union concept, we see that states’ aim is to maximize their economical interest that is correlated with the domestic preferences. When we count on the states’ economical aim that much, it is inevitable to underestimate the role of the EU institutions and the role of the supranational structure of the Union. The commercial interdependence and the domestic preferences related to financial factors seem to be the major points of the liberal approach that define the unification of the European countries on these criterions. The rationalist approach to maximize the interests in economical means is fair enough to justify the memberships of Greece in 1981 or Eastern European countries in 2004 and 2007. On the other hand, trying to understand Turkey’s rejections in a liberal level is not very possible.

One of Turkey’s main strengths is her large population and developing industry which means a new market for European Union countries. It has the potential of a new consumer group of 75 million to be reached where the demand for the European products would never be low. Also Turkey’s links with the Caucasus and the Middle East makes her very valuable to reach other markets. It has good relations with her neighbors which can be again a valuable asset for the EU. On the other hand low levels of GDP rates can be a negative factor for EU’s decisions on the economical means (ESI 2006). However, as I mentioned above, countries with low GDPs like Greece, Bulgaria and Romania are also accepted as members. What liberal-intergovernmentalist approach cannot explain alone is the rejection of Turkey’s membership by EU despite the potential of Turkey’s large population of consumers and her geographical positions as advantages.

• Constructivist Approaches and Related Explanations for Turkey – EU Relations

In his study of constructivism David Houghton simplifies the definition of constructivism very neatly: “Put simply, human beings matter because it is they who fashion and have capacity to change social reality” (Houghton 2007, 28). So the society and structures we live in comes from a social reality that is constructed by its elements. However, human beings do not live isolated to this sphere of constructed reality. Both the human beings and the realities effect each other and construct a different reality than before. The tools for shaping the reality of the society is the sum of shared ideas, beliefs, identities and actions and these are also the part of the society that is constructed (Wendt 1999, 1). It is sure that the material relations in international politics are very much focused on but the important thing is how we identify the materials related to practical actions with norms, values, beliefs and ideas.

Compared to rationalist ideas, which generally frames the role of institutions at how they help agents or organizations to pursue their interests, constructivist approach underline that the institutions that are created by human beings are some sort of sources that shape the preferences and identities of the members. (Pollack 2000, 15). At that point, constructivists argue that rationalists such as neo-realists and liberal intergovernmentalists are not capable of observing institutions in the meaning of its effects on identities and behaviors. Though, as Pollack mentions about Moravcsik’s observations, constructivists, despite their emphasis on the facts of social science, are not very encouraged to empirically test their studies which is a fundamental weakness (Pollack 2000, 16).

From a constructivist approach, the European Union project seems like very well constructed one with the help of institutions such as European Court of Justice, European Parliament or European Council alongside. Furthermore, the shared values, norms and beliefs from a democratically nurtured history and philosophy establish an environment for the EU members to be able to stay together. However, the question of the continuing national governments as parts of the Union is an important one considering their ability to create diversity inside the unity. According to Delanty, national identities and European identity are not elements that confront but elements that complement each other (Delanty and Rumford 2005, 30). He underlines that a post-national self-understanding in European identity is what matters beyond the national identities that has ability to tackle the unity. Shared values in the concepts like religion, history and democracy are some of the examples that create a unification of European identities. Though, Delanty also points out that there are mentally and physically several Europes in the geopolitical space of Europe which can be considered in civilizational, political and continental factors (Delanty and Rumford 2005, 37).

The formation of the European identity and the integration of the multiple identities in geographical and geopolitical spheres is quite understandable in the above mentioned constructivist approach. The question is can we understand the rejection of Turkish membership in that framework? When we look at the history of Turkey and European countries, there can be seen a geographical distinction between them until the Ottomans’ reach to the Vienna in 1600s and it can be shown as an evidence to the reality of the history that is not common. However, according to Delanty, there are three major geopolitical components that create the Europeanization: Judeo-Christian, Russian-Slavic and Islamic-Turkish (Delanty and Rumford 2005, 37). It is for sure that contributing to the history of Europe in some degree is not a valid card that guarantee the membership of Turkey to EU. Nevertheless, the reality that Turkey’s geographical distance to the core of the continent is not the only reality. On the other hand, it is popularly argued that the low level of performances of Turkey in norms like human rights, minority rights and rule of law prevent a more optimistic approach on Turkish membership (ESI 2006). To conclude, we can say that a constructivist approach can both defend and criticize the acceptance of Turkey at the same time. It can be criticized as Turkey do not have the exact shared values in aspects like religion or democratic values and it can be defended that Europeanization is a continuing process of integrating multiple identities which can also be seen at the acceptance of former Soviet countries as members.

IV. Justifications of Turkish Membership in Rationalist and Constructivist Approaches

Throughout the paper, I analyzed the historical process of European enlargement and Turkey – EU relations and after that I framed three theoretical approaches, which are neo-realist, liberal intergovernmentalist and constructivist approaches, to better understand the underlying factors on the European foundations and related experience of Turkey’s non-acceptance to the Union. In this part, I will argue about the facts that justify Turkey’s EU membership in rationalist (neo-realist and liberal intergovernmentalist) and constructivist approaches. I firmly believe that the addition of Turkey into the European Union would be a great asset for the continent in a rationalist view. In addition I will discuss that how Turkey can be embedded in the European society in a constructivist view.

In a rationalist approach, we should write down the cons and pros of the possible membership of Turkey. But before that, we should analyze the structure of the state relations to properly put the Turkish membership in that framework. After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union the unipolar structure of the world stage is changed. At first it seemed like an emerging bipolar world which the US would lead but the process showed that it became a multipolar world where regional powers gained importance both politically and economically. Today there are several powers which are trying to be regionally, and globally as well, influent such as China, Russia, India, Brazil and Turkey in the last couple of years. But European Union, due to its long history of alliances and experiences of integration and enlargement, seems to be in a different position. Although EU experienced issues of deepening problems and economical obstacles in the last couple of years, it is still the most reputable organization concerning Europe.

Turkey, on the other hand, is a country that is trying to be more influent in her region of Middle East. Since Turkish Foreign Policy officials adopted a “zero problem with neighbors” policy, they started to have increasing relationships with her neighbors in economical and diplomatic channels. This time of period is parallel to the time of events when Turkey seemed to slow down the EU membership process and public opinion started to discuss about Turkey’s Eastern inclination which is surprising compared to her Western-oriented approach in the past (Friedman 2010). Nonetheless, this new approach of Turkey may be a chance to prove her resources’ worth to the West which are basically her economical and diplomatic relations with the Middle East and Caucasus also.

This is obviously a rationalist view to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of the Turkish membership for the possibilities of strengthening EU’s regional power status. The most prominent advantages of Turkey is her large army which is a definite contribution the EU’s defense. Also the policy that is pursued to enhance the security of the East while accepting memberships of Eastern countries can be repeated in a different way if Turkey can be seen as an important factor to secure the South Eastern part of the continent with its geographical position. In a rationalist approach again, from a liberal perspective this time, inclusion of Turkey means a new market of approximately 75 million new customers also with the emerging areas, that are not developed very well such as industry of several materials, to be invested. In addition, Turkey’s recent good economic relations with the Middle Eastern countries increases her importance for EU as a channel to reach the further new markets.

Again from a rationalist perspective, there are also disadvantages and possible anxieties of Europeans for Turkish membership. What seems like a threat to the European Union is Turkey’s high rates of unemployment (ESI 2006). Although the young population of Turkey may sound like a possible force to increase the productiveness of European industry (Timmerman and Mels 2008, 19) many Europeans fear of the inevitable immigration of Turkish people who are to take their place in lower wages and poorer conditions (ESI 2006). This fear of the public opinion, which is in mostly practical and contemporary understanding, cannot be ignored by the national and institutional organs of the Union. Furthermore, the low rates of literacy and GDP and other similar economical factors can be an economical burden for the EU budget which has a mission to compensate each member’s status in order to decrease large level of differences among the member countries (ESI 2006).

As Helena Sjursen underlines that European expanding consists of two basic assumptions that are pragmatic thinking which we can relate to the rationalist understanding and ethical/political thinking which we can relate to the constructivist understanding (Sjursen 2002, 508). Conception of collective understanding of Europeans and the EU as a reflection of it seems to be the source of obstacle that slows down the Turkish membership. Turkey is counted as not sharing the democratic values of European countries such as human rights, rule of law or respect to minorities. Although Turkey and her Ottoman past is very much related to the European history, Turkey is seen as an Asian due to her identity related to geographical and societal factors. This approach can be proven from another perspective of constructivist thinking as Delanty underlines that Europe is not essentially a geographical border that is being changed over time constantly (Delanty and Rumford 2005, 68). As an evidence, recent members from Eastern Europe have a Soviet past of an authoritative regime but they were accepted as members. Turkey, both from a rationalist and constructivist perspective, should be accepted by European Union as a member to contribute to the practical purposes and evolving identity of the European region.

Conclusion

Throughout the paper, I argued about the justifications of Turkey’s membership in rationalist and constructivist approaches. Before thinking about Turkey’s membership, I thought that the enlargement rounds, and acceptance of 21 new members as a result, had to be analyzed to understand the enlargement processes happened in the past. What is significant is that the membership negotiations between Turkey and the EU does not seem like any negotiation happened before concerning its time and content. What I argued is that Turkey deserves to be a European Union member due to its possible contributions in economical and political areas which fits in the rationalist approach of study. Furthermore, from a constructivist approach I tried to prove the fallacy in the belief that Turkey would not be able to share the values and history of European culture. On the contrary, I underlined that Turkey has a part in the history of Europe and also the constantly evolving culture of Europeanization has the power to absorb Turkey and her different but connected history and values.




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December 8, 2010

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EYES OF THE UNITED STATES

2010

On 28th of November 2010, Wikileaks, a voluntary organization that is aimed to reveal the secrets of governments to the public, started publishing documents of reports between US state officials, US bureaucrats and US embassies. Although it is active since 2007 and despite its successful revealing leaks on subjects like abuse and violation in Iraq and Afghanistan since then, no one (publicly and governmentally) discussed the organization’s efforts like that before. There are more than 250.000 documents to be published by Wikileaks and only a small portion of it was published since now which was enough to make a world-wide controversy. There are leaks from several US embassies in the world such as Madrid, Tel-Aviv or Buenos Aires but the Turkish Embassy of US in Ankara seems to be the Achilles’ heel as there are like 8.000 documents revealed from Ankara which is the biggest number among other embassies.

Throughout the published ones of 8.000 documents from Embassy Ankara, it can be seen that the aim of US officials in Ankara was to give an insight information of AKP government, bureaucrats and Turkey’s Foreign Policy approach to the US Secretary of State. There are some important comments about Turkish Foreign Policy in the documents, which are mainly focused on the arguable Neo-Ottoman posturing of Turkey based on her active diplomatic and economic efforts in the complex regions of Asia and Europe but especially in the Middle East. In this paper, I will evaluate a document written by Embassy Ankara on 20th January 2010 which is about Turkey’s recent foreign policy direction and its motivations.

To mention first, Ahmet Davutoglu, the Turkish Foreign Minister since May of 2009, is the leading figure in Turkey’s active foreign policy efforts. With his “zero-problem” policy, Turkey is looking for creating balance in the complicated atmosphere of Middle East. Turkish officials are aiming for a pivotal role in the region and for that reason they increased the frequencies of visits to Iraq, Iran, Syria and several Arab countries. Nevertheless the bounds with European Union and United States are not broken and as a result, one may say that Turkey is far from having a pure identity as she is stuck between West and East. However this complexity helps Turkey build a calculated value-maximizing effort in international relations. Simply, Middle East countries respect Turkey because of her link with the West and Western countries respect Turkey because of her link with the East.

In the article called 10ANKARA87, published by Wikileaks, the former US ambassador James Jeffrey draws not only a comprehensive but also a simple framework of the recent Turkish Foreign Policy in addition to possible complications for the US side. In the introduction part of his report, he emphasizes the emerging desire of Turkey to be independently proactive, supported with an Islamic orientation. He summarizes the recent appearance of Turkey which was mostly Western oriented in the past: “Does all this mean that the country is becoming more focused on the Islamist world and its Muslim tradition in its foreign policy? Absolutely. Does it mean that it is "abandoning" or wants to abandon its traditional Western orientation and willingness to cooperate with us? Absolutely not.”

In his report, Jeffrey writes about the recent disturbances of Turkish elites and European Union members about Turkey’s orientation toward the East and Islamization. According to Jeffrey’s hearings, Turkish elites seem to be disturbed of the possible drift from Western world and EU seems to be disturbed of being a part of AKP’s Christian vs Muslim or Europe vs Middle East separation campaign. However, Jeffrey never mentions about a disadvantage for US in this separation. Despite the fact that US never desires an Islam Republic in Turkey as their companionship is built upon the Western-oriented perspectives and institutions, Jeffrey welcomes the option of sharing responsibility of the region with Turkey. As a result, US does not react Turkey in a negative manner for using Islam as a tool or ideology as long as they stay strong enough to help Americans in the Middle East. However a loss of control, such as losing the air space or Incirlik base, would be unacceptable for US.

Furthermore, another aspect of the recent Turkey Foreign Policy that makes US uncomfortable is Turkey’s Neo-Ottoman posturing around the Middle East and the Balkans. There is a quote from Davutoglu’s thesis in the report: “the Balkans, Caucasus, and Middle East were all better off when under Ottoman control or influence; peace and progress prevailed. Alas the region has been ravaged by division and war ever since.” On the other hand, Jeffrey claims that despite her active foreign policy and economic growth, Turkey still does not have enough power to compete with the region’s leading states like US, Russia or Iran. According to him Turkey is in need of an underdog to call for a help from her and show her capabilities as a result. This is a very good observation and it should be added that until that time Turkey will still be in need of the protection and support of Western countries. Actually Jeffrey simply summarizes Turkey’s condition with a metaphor and describe Turkey as a Rover with Rolls Royce dreams.

What US really wants from Turkey, apart from calming down the tension with Israel, is to draw Syria from Iran and begin achieving practical results, not just phone calls and conversations. Turkey is in calm relations with Iran and not opposing her strictly due to the nuclear power issue makes Turkey the only major country that is in friendly discussion with Iran. In return, US expects from Turkey to benefit from this positive relationship and be more demanding from Iran in Security Council meetings, to stop her nuclear progress.

To sum up, it is obvious that the changing direction of the Turkish Foreign Policy is being carefully observed by the US officials. Their arguments are mostly reasonable and it seems that US will not be interfering in Turkey’s turning back to East, whether in a Neo-Ottoman posturing or not, as long as they do not let go of the Western traditions and companionship of US, which is not a rational choice by the way. Actually, James Jeffrey summarizes Turkey’s situation very well: “Turkey will remain a complicated blend of world class "Western" institutions, competencies, and orientation, and Middle Eastern culture and religion.”

November 19, 2010

REALITIES BEYOND OPTIMISM

2010

On 9th of November 2010, The European Commission published the progress report of Turkey and it seems that despite the optimistic atmosphere that is created by Turkey’s Chief Negotiator Egemen Bagis afterwards the publish, Turkey still needs a lot of time and effort to be accepted by European Union as a full member. Although nobody can ignore the fair progress that was succeeded by Turkish officials in certain areas (which is also underlined in the progress report of 2010), the two certain issues are on the table to be resolved: Full implantation of the Customs Union obligations with the EU and the progress towards the normalization of relations with Cyprus.

The first statement after the publish of progress report came from the Chief Negotiator Egemen Bagis: “This progress report is far more better than the one in 2009 which was the most positive report until that time. Now we can get the smell of EU membership.” It is pretty normal to hear such a statement from Egemen Bagis who is a dynamic and optimistic negotiator. But what needs to be done is to carefully examine the picture taken by the European Commission on behalf of the further progress that should be realized by Turkey. Yet, the tricky part is when you attempt to write down the pros and cons highlighted in the 2010 report, you see that, in nearly all lines, there has been a progress which is not sufficient enough.

According to the report, the political criteria is being sufficiently fulfilled by Turkey; thanks to the progress in public administration alongside with judiciary and fundamental rights with the approval of constitutional amendments in a referendum in 12th of September. Still, more efforts are needed on areas such as freedom of media and minority rights (fail of democratic opening for Kurdish people are emphasized). Moreover, in the economical aspects, growing market economy is praised in the report in spite of the continuing unemployment problem and external imbalances. Also the report shows that some laws and regulations that are to be aligned with EU’s are accomplished such as the State Aid Law which is a step towards the negotiations in the area of competition. Nevertheless, several number of developments are required in areas such as fisheries, social policies, justice and home affairs.

Beyond all these pros, cons and statements of “almost successful but not sufficient”, two crucial issues still stand in front of the EU membership of Turkey: First is the need for fully implementing the Customs Union obligations which in brief a large number of obstacles to be removed affecting EU products that are in free circulation. Second is the relations with Cyprus which in brief enabling direct transport links and allowing the free movement of goods with the island. Furthermore, the normalization of relations with Cyprus is vital as, in practical sense, the EU membership of Cyprus enables it to possibly object to the membership of Turkey.

Eventually, it should be remembered that only 13 of possible 33 acquis chapters of negotiations are opened and only one of them is closed. Nobody expects from Turkey to close all the chapters in the blink of an eye but if somebody is to get a smell of hope, he should be close to the table. No offense to the optimistic stance of Egemen Bagis but Commissioner Füle’s statements are also important as the demanding side is Turkey in this game: “Despite the progress in 2009, we are concerned that Turkey’s accession process is losing its momentum. The key to changing this is primarily with Turkey, which is expected to fully implement its current contractual relations with the EU –Customs Union- before it can gear up to full membership of the Union.”

January 11, 2010

BEING A WORLD POWER: ILLUSIONS AND REALITIES

2009

Years after the Second World War (1939-1945), it was understood that the year 1945 meant not only the end of war but also the start of a period when new power structures were being shaped and new world powers were being emerged. It is also the year that signifies the beginning of Britain’s imperial power impoverish which was realized years later. In this paper, considering the 1946-1961 period, I will try to show why Britain changed her mind to join the European Economic Community in 1961 which she once ignored to be a part of.

My theory is that once an imperial world power, Britain could not protect her place after the Second World War (WWII) and in the time of emerging new powers that are US and USSR, she decided to link herself with the newly rising European Economic Community to strengthen her position. Throughout the paper, to support my theory, there will be several points to be emphasized such as how US and USSR became world powers after the Second World War; in which circumstances Britain lost its imperial power and how European countries gathered together and established an economically and in some respect politically rising community that grabbed attention of Britain.

In the beginning, to understand the spirit of the time, we should look closely at the post-war surroundings. After the WWII, when European countries were in poor conditions both physically and morally, many people expected Britain to take the lead in reorganizing Europe because of her wartime role (Urwin 2007, p. 18). In spite of that, Britain was highly negative about any form of integration with other European countries mostly counting on their proud wartime role and history of sovereignty-first perspective. Their understanding of foreign policy was based on relations with US and Commonwealth countries and not with devastated European countries which could possibly distract her from being a self-independent world power (Dinan 2004, p. 24). In addition, this solitary perspective of Britain can be testified from the first hand which is the British President of the time, Winston Churchill.

In 1946, Winston Churchill gave a speech at Zurich University where he clearly showed the road map of his country: “The first step is to form a Council of Europe (…) In all this urgent work, France and Germany must take the lead together. Great Britain, the British Commonwealth of Nations, mighty America and Soviet Russia must be the friends and sponsors of the new Europe” (Nelsen and Stubb 2004, p. 11). Although Britain showed European countries some courage, in reality they were in need of the political leadership of Britain, due to her post-war confidence and prestige. Certainly it was a tactical mistake of British headquarters to stay passive which they paid for most years to come where US and USSR became replacing world powers (Mander 1963, p. 188).

To describe how US gained her world power status while getting rid of her isolationist policies, two striking approaches should be carefully examined. One of them was the Marshall aids, which was to help European countries that were ruined economically after the WWII. By the help of this recovery program, US was looking to establish a solid market ground for her exports by gaining companionship of European countries (ENA, Historical Events). Another initiative by US was North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) which was formed for the aim of military alliance, whereby United States were now committed to Western Europe’s defense and so that continental Europeans were less dependent militarily on Britain (Dinan 2004, p. 36).

On the other hand, in the Eastern Europe, Soviet Russia already proved herself as a militarily strong country by standing still against the Nazis in the WWII. Moreover, their expansionist and aggressive ideas over Western Europe which were also supported by the rising communism ideology and her superior technological advancements comparing with the continent made them one of the Cold War actors alongside with the US. These formations were leading the world to a politically bipolarized form for many years to come which is also indicating the point I will come in the upcoming paragraphs: the decline of the Britain as a world power.

The political and economic contradictions and competition between the Cold War actors, the US and the USSR, led to not only a geographically but also a politically compressed Europe. Before coming to the reasons of Britain’s decline, I see a necessity to explain how European unification is shaped and caught attention of Britain in the late 1950s. First of all, one possible outside stimulus that brought weakened post-war countries of Europe together was the Cold War contention between US and USSR, which was fueled by initiatives such as Marshall Plan and NATO of US and the offensive and expansionist ideas of the Soviets (Mander 1963, p. 184).

Nevertheless, it was the decision and determination of European countries to form a unification that might lead them to a fresh exit from the economically and physically obscure atmosphere of that time. Consequently, the idea of supranational authority was accepted one way or another and after several theoretical debates European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was formed with the pioneering cooperation of France and Germany to help the continent compose an economically more stable ground (Urwin 2007, p. 18). This alliance continued under the formations of European Economic Community (EEC) and Euratom owing to the agreement named Treaty of Rome in 1957 (Lee 1996, p. 283).

In a narrow perspective, it can be seen that the main objective of European Unification was to provide an economical integration so the member countries might get better conditions under the regulations that facilitate the commercial relations. But more than that, although the agreements were made under the topic of “economics”, the long term aim was to establish the political unification of Western Europe (Shanks and Lambert 1962, p. 165). As a result European nations had embarked on a road which would lead in the end to all major economic and also political decisions being made on behalf of Europe as a whole (Beddington-Behrens 1966, p. 18). In addition, it was the start of a century, which was already suffered enough of wars, that economical power was now the heart of having a strong political position in the world. This unification process of European continent led to an economical and political rise in 1950s whereby Britain’s power was waning as a consequence of her post-war tactical mistakes and illusions of still being an independent world power (Hörber 2006, p. 340).

While European countries were unifying to form an economical and political influence and the US and the USSR were emerging as newly world powers, Britain, on the other hand, was experiencing a declining process which can be plainly portrayed by the consequences of two main incidents: Decolonization of Commonwealth countries and Suez Crisis. First to mention, decolonization process of Asian and African countries, which generally took place in 1940s and 1950s, was mostly encouraged by the post-war international climate and the two anti-colonialist superpowers, the US and the USSR (ENA, Historical Events).

As the perception of economically counting upon the colonized Commonwealth countries was in the core of their politics, the most effected world power from this independence trend was Britain. Not only she lost her links with countries like India that she trusted in political issues but also she lost her strength in overseas markets while the newly independent countries started to link commercial links with countries other than Britain (Lee 1996, p. 290). The United States, the anti-colonialist and triggering power of the independence trend, was now the main commercial partner of former Commonwealth countries owing to her highly developed economy and large population of 180 million people (Beddington-Bahrens 1966, p. 133).

While decolonization process of Commonwealth countries is indicating the decline of Britain’s economic power, Suez Crisis shows how Britain lost its world power status through the political consequences of the incident. After Egypt’s decision to nationalize the Suez Canal in 1956, Britain and France sent troops to Egypt to gain control of the canal. Although they were militarily successful, they had to leave the Suez Canal due to the threat of nuclear bombings to London and Paris by the anti-colonialist Soviet Union. Likewise, despite being the traditional allies of the European powers, the United States did not appreciate this kind of neo-colonial diplomacy and used extreme financial and diplomatic pressure on British government through the United Nations (ENA, Historical Events). The obvious conclusion that the Suez Crisis exposed was that Britain, alongside with France, was no longer a world power, being beaten by the US and the USSR on political, economical, technological and martial circumstances (Hörber 2006, 340).

Contrasting to newly emerged world powers which are the US and the USSR and the significance of the recently unifying European countries through several economic agreements such as the Common Market, Britain soon realized that she had to increase her activities in economical aspects. After several failed attempts of Britain to make economic arrangements and form a free trade area with the six countries of the Common Market, she later established the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) with non-members of the EEC which are Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland (Dinan 2005, p. 44).

But the outcomes of the EFTA was not like Britain had desired as the EFTA members were vitally interested in trading with the rest of the world and were looking for a more integrated European market (Beddington-Behrens 1966, p. 48). In the meantime, EEC members continued their closer economical integration. As a result, the lacking free access of Britain to the necessary European markets made her notice that she could not compete with the EEC since her economical performance were far less than the members of the union (Lee 1996, p. 290).

In this atmosphere of changing power structures, Britain had to replace herself in the updated political and economical senses, in a different direction than before (Lloyd 1986, p. 373) One of the options, the most probable one which helped me construct my theory, was joining the EEC which was establishing its political unity increasingly out of economical integration. In a political atmosphere in which new and greater world powers were emerged, Britain had to change her existing perception and take a different way to stop her weakening in the political issues. Continental Europe was now a political force which Britain had to reckon and eventually she applied for membership to the EEC in 1961 (Urwin 2007, p. 24).

One question can be asked: Was joining the EEC the only option that Britain had to improve her political and economical status? Apparently it was the most sensible decision Britain made in the period of 15 years. Other than joining the EEC, one option could be strengthening links with her historical partner, the US. However it was irrational that the US, in the process of the Suez Crisis, had already shown her desire to be a world power alone without the help of Britain. On the other hand, although the USSR were showing a good perspective of being a partner that was technologically and militarily rising, the main reason that Britain had stayed away from her was the ideological difference, considering the Communist regime of the Soviets (ENA, Historical Events). The last option might be to strengthen ties with the Commonwealth countries again while it was obvious that the independence trend led an irreversible change of character for the former member nations. In the end, Britain could not reproduce her former devoted relations with the newly-independent nations anymore.

After the WWII it was the passive and non-involving presence of Britain which made a decrease in her world power. Success of the new EEC institutions alongside with the economical arrangements were the positive consequences of European countries’ progressive approaches to take their fate into their own hands, which Britain could not match. When it was most needed for her own benefit, not taking an active role in world politics and on the contrary continuing her conservative policies and unenthusiastic point of view for a supranational authority, changed Britain’s formerly esteemed position in the world politics and it was a necessity to alter her mind and apply to be a partner of EEC members where a chance of political and economical progress might appear eventually.


BIBLIOGRAPHY


Shanks, Michael and Lambert, John. 1962. Britain and the New Europe: The Future of the Common Market. London: Chatto and Windus.

Mander, John. 1963. Great Britain or Little England. Middlesex: Penguin Books.

Beddington-Bahrens, Edward. 1966. Is There Any Choice? Britain Must Join Europe. Middlesex: Penguin Books.

Lloyd, T. O. 1986. Empire to Welfare State. New York: Oxford University Press.

Lee, Stephen J. 1996. Aspects of British Political History 1914-1995. London: Routledge.

Nelsen, Brent F. and Stubb, Alexander. 2004. “The Tragedy of Europe” Speech of Winston Churchill at Zurich University in The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Dinan, Desmond. 2004. "What Kind of Union" in Europe Recast. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Dinan, Desmond. 2005. "Uncertain Terrain, 1958-1972" in Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Hörber, Thomas. 2006. The Foundations of Europe, European Integration Ideas in France, Germany and Britain in 1950s. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag Für Sozialwissenschaften.

Urwin, Derek W. 2007. "The European Community: From 1945 to 1985" in European Union Politics. Michelle Cini. New York: Oxford University Press.

ENA (European Navigator). Historical Events. http://www.ena.lu/ (accessed in December 27, 2009)
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